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ABSTRACT 
The Transmission of Mentalization: 
How Parental Reflective Function on the Parent Development Interview Relates to Child 
Mentalization on the Thematic Apperception Test 
 
By Kira Boesch 
 
Chair: Steven Tuber, Ph.D. 
 
Mentalization is defined as the metacognitive ability to think about one’s own and 
other’s thoughts and feelings, with the goal of comprehending behavior (Benbassat & 
Priel, 2012). Mentalization is associated with secure attachment, and is both directly and 
indirectly linked to multiple social and emotional outcomes. This study looked at the 
correlation between parent and child mentalization as a means of exploring the impact of 
parent reflectiveness on children’s’ mentalization capacities.    
Methods: This study utilized archival data collected at The Psychological Center, a 
community mental health clinic at the City College of New York. The sample consisted 
of 15 parent-child dyads. Data was collected as part of the intake process for children 
beginning treatment at The Psychological Center. The children in this clinical population 
ranged in age from 4.5 to 15.  
Parent reflective function (RF) was measured using Fonagy’s RF scale (Fonagy, 
Target, Steele & Steele, 1998) as applied to the Parent Development Interview (Aber, 
Slade, Berger, Bresgi & Kaplan, 1985). Child mentalization was measured in an original 
way, using a composite measure of seven scales of the Social Cognition and Object 
Relations Scale (SCORS; Westen, 2002) as applied to the Thematic Apperception Test 
(Morgan & Murray, 1935).  
Results: This study did not yield any statistically significant results. However, the effect 
sizes of the correlations indicated a trend by which parent and child mentalization 
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capacities did appear to be positively associated with one another, with parent reflective 
function also appearing to be related to various aspects of child object relations.  
Discussion: Methodological limitations are discussed so as to shed light on directions for 
future research on this important topic.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For the first many months of a child’s life, he* is literally dependent upon those 
around him to interpret his needs, wants, desires, and wishes. His inability to express his 
inner states is not for his want of having them, as anyone who has spent time with a 
young child can attest. He can think and feel and desire, and yet his ability to express 
those things remains primitive for several years. Not only can he not yet meet his own 
needs or satisfy his own wants, he also cannot express them unequivocally. It could be 
argued that the job of the caretaker of a young child is almost entirely comprised of 
construing the child’s meanings. Even caring for an infant’s most basic, most physical 
needs requires this process of interpretation of his inner states. Is that sharp cry indicating 
the feeling of hunger, of discomfort due to a wet diaper, or the desire for a cuddle?  
One can only imagine that in each and every parent-child dyad, this process of 
interpretation looks a little bit different- that no two caregivers would construe a child’s 
expressions identically. Luckily, as Winnicott captured in his concept of the “good 
enough mother” most parents’ versions of responsiveness to their children’s expressions 
result in a child’s physical and emotional needs being met sufficiently well (Winnicott, 
1960). But what are the individual differences that result from the distinct ways in which 
caregivers’ interpret a young child’s expressions?  
It has now been well-documented that parents’ interactions with their children 
strongly influence children’s social and emotional competencies, including their 
understanding of their own and others’ minds (e.g. Kårstad, Wichstrøm, Reinfjell, Belsky 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* For ease of reading, the male pronoun is used here to represent children of both genders.  	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& Berg‐Nielsen, 2015; Doan & Wang, 2010; Ereky-Stevens, 2008; Taumoepeau & 
Ruffman, 2008; Racine, Carpendale & Turnbull, 2006; Symons, Fossum & Collins, 2006; 
Shipman & Zeman, 2001; Ruffman, Perner & Parkin, 1999; Eisenberg, Cumberland & 
Spinrad, 1998; Gottman, Katz & Hooven, 1996; Denham, Zoller & Couchoud, 1994; 
Dunn, Brown & Beardsall, 1991a; Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla & Youngblade, 
1991b; Dix & Lochman, 1990.) As Main (1991) stated, children’s early relationships 
with their caregivers not only help to shape the content of the child’s mind- what they 
know- but also ability of the child to use this knowledge. This observation highlights the 
importance of the emotional tenor of the child’s earliest and most important relationships 
with his caregivers. It is not just how a caregiver treats ‘emotion’ as a construct, but how 
the caregiver treats the child, and responds to the child’s emotions, that influence the 
child’s budding relationship to himself, to others, and to the world of feelings. It is 
therefore critical to study the way in which parents think about their children and their 
feelings in the context of the parent-child relationship. The current study proposes to do 
just that. The extent to which parents reflect on their children’s internal states will be 
investigated in terms of its effect on their children’s capacity to consider the thoughts and 
feelings of others. Parent interviews about their children, coded for reflectiveness about 
their child’s minds, will be correlated with the extent to which children reflect on the 
minds of others as measured by a storytelling test.  
The literature review below will first briefly introduce the construct of 
attachment, as the backdrop against which the measure of parental reflectiveness used in 
the current study (reflective function) was developed. It will then introduce the principal 
constructs that have been used to study the impact of parent reflectiveness on parent-child 
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relationships. The reciprocal relationship between reflective function and attachment will 
then be reviewed. The importance of reflective function as an outcome variable will be 
illustrated through the literature linking reflective function to the creation of a robust 
sense of self, as well as research that establishes the connection between poor reflective 
function and risk for psychopathology. Finally, the current research will be presented in 
the context of recent studies that provide preliminary evidence for the primary hypothesis 
that parent reflection of the child’s internal states facilitates the development of this same 
capacity in the child.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Attachment 
The attachment system was initially conceptualized by John Bowlby, who viewed 
it primarily as a means through which human infants receive the protection that they 
require (Bowlby, 1969.) Bowlby viewed the infant’s attachment behavior with his 
caregiver as evolutionarily-driven, yet nevertheless experienced by the infant as a more 
or less satisfying emotional relationship. Bowlby and the attachment theorists who 
succeeded him suggested that children internalize elements of their earliest relationships, 
forming “internal working models” or mental representations of what close relationships 
are like (Bowlby, 1969; Bretherton, 1992).   
Mary Ainsworth’s pioneering research established a system for identifying 
individual differences in infant’s attachment patterns in the context of the relationship 
with their primary caregivers (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall, 1978). Ainsworth 
developed the research paradigm commonly referred to as “strange situation” in which an 
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infant’s behavior is observed over a series of separations and reunions with her caregiver 
(Ainsworth, 1970). Ainsworth’s empirically-derived classification system remains in use 
today. In this system, secure attachment is contrasted with three types of insecure 
attachment- insecure avoidant, insecure resistant and disorganized attachment. Secure, 
insecure avoidant and insecure resistant attachments describe organized patterns of 
response to separations from the primary caregiver. In contrast, the category of 
disorganized attachment represents a lack of a systematic response to separation distress 
on the part of the infant (Main & Hesse, 1990.) In the case of a secure attachment, the 
infant can trust that his needs will be met by his caregiver. The parent has been reliably 
present for the infant in a predictable fashion. This allows for the infant’s use of the 
parent as a secure base from which to explore the surrounding environment with maximal 
freedom and flexibility (Ainsworth & Bell, 1970). In contrast, babies classified as 
insecure avoidant are thought to be overregulating their needs for closeness, comfort and 
security (Slade, 2000). Behaviorally, they favor an interest in the world of objects over 
expression of their needs for connection with others. Infants classified as insecure 
resistant demonstrate ambivalent feelings toward their mothers upon reunion in the 
strange situation, a manifestation of dysregulated emotions in which a need for closeness 
is manifest alongside anger at the mother for leaving (Slade, 2000).   
Based on Bowlby’s original notion of internal working models, Main, Kaplan and 
Cassidy (1985) argued for individual differences in attachment organization to be viewed 
instead as individual differences in the mental representation of attachment. This 
reconceptualization opened the door to empirically studying attachment classifications in 
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adults by analyzing their narratives about relationships. Main et al., (1985) introduced the 
Adult Attachment Interview in order to do just that. 
The Adult Attachment Interview.  
The AAI is a semi-structured interview that asks adults 15 standardized questions 
pertaining to their relationships with their parents. The interview asks that adults report 
on aspects of their relationships to their parents when they were children, yet it demands 
that parents reflect on their memories from their present perspective (van IJzendoorn, 
1995). Adults are prompted to provide specific memories to support their more general 
statements (Main et al., 1985).  
The AAI does not measure the security of the adult’s attachment relationship to 
their parents per se. Rather, it was designed to assess the adult’s present state of mind 
with respect to attachment, or in other words, her mental representation of how 
information about close relationships is internally organized, approached, or avoided (van 
IJzendoorn, 1995). The AAI was developed for use with parents under the assumption 
that individual differences in parents’ mental representations of attachment would affect 
their response to their child’s attachment signals and thus have a large affect on the 
nature of the child’s attachment relationships (Slade, Grienenberger, Bernbach, Levy & 
Locker, 2004). As a result, the three major classifications of adult mental attachment 
representations are based upon the organized categories of infant attachment.   
The classification of secure is given to adults who provide clear narratives that are 
well-supported by their examples and memories, and thus are deemed to be coherent in 
their evaluation of their past experiences, regardless of the nature of those experiences or 
early relationships themselves (Van IJzendoorn, 1995). The dismissing classification is 
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assigned to narratives in which the participant seems to minimize their attention to 
attachment-related feelings and experiences, and often reports difficulty remembering 
things pertaining to their attachment relationships (Slade, Grienenberger, Bernbach, Levy 
& Locker, 2005; Main et al., 1985.) A participant classified as dismissive may provide 
descriptions of parents that either lack support or are even directly contradicted within the 
narrative, without the conscious realization of this by the interviewee (Slade et al., 
2005b). Finally, the preoccupied classification is reserved for participants who seem to be 
attending too much to attachment-related phenomena, demonstrating preoccupation with 
attachment figures and sometimes displaying heightened affect with regard to their 
caregivers. Their narratives tend to be long and to digress from the issue at hand, at times 
even appearing nonsensical. Adults whose narratives are categorized as dismissing and 
preoccupied are considered to have insecure mental representations of attachment 
relationships (Main et al., 1985). Following Main et al.’s (1985) initial qualitative study, 
a fourth classification was established, which is usually referred to as unresolved. This 
classification is assigned to parents who cannot be classified in any of the other three 
categories (Main & Hesse, 1990).  
These adult attachment classifications have been shown to be stable over time. 
Ward Carlson and Altman (1992, as cited in Benoit & Parker, 1994) demonstrated that 
the AAI classifications remained stable for adolescent mothers between pregnancy and a 
second AAI administration 18 months later. Bakermans-Kranenburg and Van IJzendoorn 
(1993) found that 78% of AAI classifications from AAI’s administered two months apart 
were concordant in a sample of mothers in the Netherlands. Benoit and Parker (1994) 
replicated this result with a sample of Caucasian mothers from middle to upper middle 
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class homes. They found that when mothers were administered the AAI during the last 
month of pregnancy and again when their babies were 12 months old, the concordance 
between the two classifications assigned was 77%. Furthermore, when looking only at the 
three resolved categories of attachment classifications, the authors observed a 90% 
concordance rate within individuals. In this last sample, Benoit and Parker (1994) found 
that a secure attachment classification was more likely to endure than an insecure 
classification.  
 One of the main demonstrations of the empirical strength of the AAI has been its 
consistent ability to predict the attachment classification of infants based on the AAI 
classification of their parents. The following section will review this robust literature.  
The Intergenerational Transmission of Attachment 
 Numerous studies performed across diverse countries and populations have 
demonstrated that secure attachment is transmitted across generations. Main et al., (1985) 
first demonstrated this in a longitudinal study. In a sample of mothers drawn from the 
Berkeley Social Development Project, they found that parent-infant attachment status 
when the child was 12-18 months old was significantly correlated with their parents’ 
attachment classification on the AAI 5 years later. This finding was stronger for mothers, 
with a correlation of r = .62, but significant for both parents nevertheless (father AAI 
classification was correlated with infant-father attachment security with a Pearson 
correlation of r= .37).  
 Van IJzendoorn,  Kranenburg, Zwart-Woudstra, and Van Busschbach, (1991) 
replicated this finding on a sample of parents in the Netherlands. Like Main et al., (1985), 
they administered the AAI to parents following the assessment of attachment security of 
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parents to their infants, in this case two years later. They found a very strong association 
between the AAI classification of mothers and the attachment security of their infants. 
77% of the infants could be classified as either secure or insecure as a function of their 
mother’s AAI classification as autonomous or nonautonomous. In contrast, only 62% of 
infants could be classified on the basis of paternal AAI classification, a number that only 
approached statistical significance (van IJzendoorn et al., 1991).   
  Benoit and Parker (1994) again replicated this finding but with the important 
difference of the mother’s AAI classification being assessed during her pregnancy, prior 
to the assessment of her infant’s attachment status more than one year later. The authors 
found that the concordance rate was 68% when all four AAI classifications were utilized 
and 81% using only the original three resolved categories of attachment organization. 
The researchers furthermore found a significant concordance between grandmothers’ and 
mothers’ AAI classifications in 81 dyads using the 3-category classification system.  
 Ward and Carlson (1995) extended these findings to a sample of economically 
disadvantaged adolescent women primarily of minority status. In this study the AAI was 
administered during the 3rd trimester of pregnancy, and infants were observed in the 
strange situation at 15 months of age. There was a correspondence rate of 78% between 
autonomous/nonautonomous classification on the AAI for the adolescent mothers and 
secure/insecure infant attachment. Furthermore, 73% of moms classified as dismissing 
had avoidant infants, 86% of moms classified as autonomous had secure infants, 60% of 
moms classified as preoccupied had resistant infants, and 43% of moms classified as 
unresolved had disorganized infants.  
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 Finally, in his extensive review, van IJzendoorn (1995) further established that the 
effect size for the relationship between parental and child attachment was impressively 
large, with an effect size of 1.06 for the secure/insecure split in a sample of 854 dyads 
across 18 studies, including some of those detailed above. These strong findings present 
the question of what the mechanism for the transmission of attachment may be. In his 
review, Van IJzendoorn (1995) not only looked at the transmission of attachment across 
generations, but also performed a meta-analysis of studies linking the AAI to parental 
sensitivity/responsiveness given that sensitivity has often been theorized to be an 
important mechanism through which attachment may be transmitted. However, van 
IJzendoorn found unconvincing evidence for parent responsiveness as a mediator of 
attachment transmission. In subsequent studies, parental reflective function has emerged 
as a strong contender. These studies will be detailed below in the section on 
mentalization and attachment, following an introduction of mentalization and related 
concepts.  
 
Conceptualizations of Parent Reflectiveness 
There are several constructs that have been developed as lenses through which to 
examine parental responsiveness to their children’s internal states. Three such constructs 
are Mind-Mindedness (MM), developed by Meins (1997), Parental-Meta-Emotion 
Philosophy (PMEP), developed by Gottman and colleagues (1996), and Mentalization, 
developed by Fonagy and colleagues (1991). These three constructs can be seen as 
measuring discrete but overlapping concepts. Given their overlap, each of these 
constructs is sometimes referred to as “mentalization” within studies, even though that 
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name originally was within the theoretical terminology developed by Fonagy and 
colleagues.  
Mind-mindedness 
Mind-mindedness refers to “the proclivity to treat one’s infant as an individual 
with a mind, capable of intentional behavior” (Meins et al., 2002, p. 1716). It is 
operationalized during the infant’s first year of life as the parent’s propensity to comment 
accurately and to not comment inappropriately on the infant’s internal states assumed to 
underlie behavior. Mind-mindedness has been measured in two principal ways. In some 
studies, parents were simply asked, “Can you describe [child] to me?” (e.g. Meins & 
Fernyhough, 1999; Meins, Fernyhough, Russell & Clark-Carter, 1998). Attributes of the 
child given in response to this question were then coded as “mental,” “behavioral,” 
“physical” and “general.” Higher levels of “mental” responses were interpreted as higher 
levels of mind-mindedness. Mind-mindedness has concurrently been measured through 
the coding of parent vocalizations to their infant during observed parent-child interactions 
(Meins & Fernyhough, 1999; Meins, Fernyhough, Fradley & Tuckey, 2001; Meins et al., 
2002).  
One of the main areas of mind-mindedness research has been its effect on parents’ 
interpretations of children’s developing language. For example, Meins and Fernyhough 
(1999) found that mothers who were more likely to describe their children in terms of 
mental characteristics at age 3 were also more likely to have attributed meaning to their 
children’s earliest vocalizations in infancy. The authors viewed this as a demonstration of 
the continuity of maternal mind-mindedness of the first three years of life.  
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Mind-mindedness has also been linked to attachment. Meins et al., (2001) found 
that mothers who administered more appropriate mind-related comments with infants 
aged 6 months were significantly more likely to have infants classified as secure in the 
strange situation at 12 months. Meins et al., (2002) replicated this result and also found 
that attachment security was negatively correlated with mother’s inappropriate mind-
related comments. This pattern of differential effects of appropriate and inappropriate 
mind-related comments have led Meins and other researchers to separately consider the 
independent effects of attuned and unattuned mentalistic comments as theoretically 
distinct constructs.  
Several studies have also linked mind-mindedness to theory of mind development 
in children. Meins et al., (1998) found that mothers’ tendency to describe their three year 
olds in mentalistic terms was positively correlated with their children’s performance on 
two theory of mind tasks one year later. Meins et al., (2002) and Meins et al., (2003) also 
found positive associations between mothers’ appropriate mind-minded comments when 
children were six months old and theory of mind performance between 4-5 years of age. 
Given the direct implications of these studies for the present research, they are presented 
in greater detail in a subsequent section of this literature review. 
Parent Meta-Emotion Philosophy  
Parent meta-emotion philosophy (PMEP) is conceptually distinct from mind-
mindedness in that it encompasses a parent’s thoughts and feelings about emotions- not 
just their own but their children’s as well (Gottman, Katz & Hooven, 1996). PMEP 
involves elements of parental beliefs and behaviors. The researchers noted in pilot studies 
that certain parents displayed a comfort with and willingness to engage with emotion 
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(especially negative emotion) that amounted to their acting as emotion coaches with their 
children. The concept of PMEP was derived from these observations to include a parent’s 
awareness of his own and his child’s emotion, and a stance that his child’s expression of 
negative emotion is an opportunity for closeness or coaching. It also includes validation 
of his child’s emotion, the behavior of helping the child to label his feelings, and 
problem-solving aimed at understanding the situation surrounding the negative emotion. 
 In the foundational study of PMEP, Gottman et al., (1996) conducted a “meta-
emotion interview” with parents in which parents were asked about their experiences of 
sadness and anger, their philosophy of emotional expression and control, and their 
feelings and behavior with regard to their children’s anger and sadness. Parents and 
children (aged 4-5) were then observed engaged in two tasks, one in which the parent 
taught the child a game, and a second in which the parent tried to elicit a story from the 
child that the child had just been told. The children were later shown emotionally explicit 
film clips while measures of their physiological arousal were measured. Three years later, 
teachers, parents and children completed multiple scales assessing a range of child 
outcomes including indicators of internalizing and externalizing behaviors, affect 
expression, peer aggression, affect achievement, emotion regulation and physical health 
(Gottman et al., 1996). The authors found support for PMEP in that meta-emotion (as 
measured by the parent interview) was related to parenting behavior (less derogation and 
more scaffolding-praising) and the child’s regulatory physiology during the first phase of 
the study. Meta- emotion as assessed in this first phase of the study was also significantly 
able to predict greater inhibitory control, lower levels of behavior problems, higher levels 
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of academic achievement and better physical health in children in the second phase of the 
study (Gottman et al., 1996; Katz Maliken & Stettler, 2012).  
PMEP has since been linked to a variety of psychosocial child outcomes. It has 
been studied in terms of how it affects children’s peer relationships and social 
competence, and has been shown to be related to superior social skills in both 
preschoolers and latency-aged children (Katz et al., 2012). Various studies have 
established its connection with risk for psychopathology. For example, in a sample of 
families with children in middle childhood from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, 
Lunkenheimer, Shields and Cortina (2007) looked at how emotion coaching and emotion 
dismissing by parents related to child externalizing problems. In this study, emotion 
coaching and dismissing were coded from a family interaction in the laboratory as 
opposed to being coded from a parent interview as in Gottman et al., (1996). The authors 
found that emotion dismissing was significantly negatively correlated with children’s 
externalizing behaviors, but emotion coaching did not directly predict fewer externalizing 
behaviors, contrary to the hypothesis. These authors also found that in families where 
parents engaged in both emotion coaching and dismissing, emotion coaching was related 
to lower internalizing problems for children, and less emotional lability. This effect was 
specifically driven by the coaching of negative emotions (Lunkenheimer et al., 2007).  
Other studies have also found evidence for the relationship between PMEP and 
both externalizing and internalizing behaviors.  Shortt, Stoolmiller, Smith-Shine, Eddy & 
Sheeber (2010) studied a large community sample comprised of sibling pairs with one 
child in late elementary school and one child in middle school. They administered the 
Parent Meta-Emotion Interview (Katz & Gottman, 1986) to mothers and found that 
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mothers’ emotion coaching of anger was linked to better anger regulation in the 
adolescent sibling, and fewer externalizing behaviors three years later in the younger 
sibling (Shortt et al., 2010). Finally, Katz and Hunter (2007) found that mothers who 
were more accepting and expressive of their own emotions (as assessed in the Parent 
Meta-Emotion Interview) were more likely to have adolescents with lower levels of 
depressive symptoms, higher self-esteem and fewer externalizing problems.  
Mentalization 
Finally, there is the concept of mentalization, which encompasses important 
elements of mind-mindedness and PMEP. Mentalization is the preconscious process by 
which people view and interpret behavior as being caused by mental states. It entails 
imagining what others might be thinking or feeling while keeping in mind that even with 
regard to oneself, one cannot definitively know the contents of someone’s mind (Fonagy, 
2006). Like PMEP, it is believed to require metacognitive processes, that is, an ability to 
monitor, assess, and generally observe one’s own thought processes. Mentalization has 
been defined as the metacognitive ability to think about one’s own and others’ thoughts 
and feelings, with the goal of comprehending behavior (Benbassat & Priel, 2012).  
Mentalization encompasses both self-reflective and interpersonal aspects 
(Benbassat & Priel, 2012; Slade, 2005). With regard to the self, mentalization involves 
the processes of being open to emotional experience and to the process of making 
meaning of emotional experiences non-defensively (Slade, 2005). Simultaneously, 
mentalizing includes an effort to understand the thoughts, feelings, intentions, beliefs and 
desires of others and is considered to be a necessary and foundational prerequisite to 
productive significant relationships (Benbassat & Priel, 2012; Slade, 2005). As a means 
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of better understanding the distinct mental processes at play in various situations, some 
researchers have recently begun to separate mentalization processes dedicated to the 
understanding of the self and those directed toward the other (e.g. Ensink et al., 2015).  
Mentalization is thought to be an emotional process as well as a cognitive one. In 
addition to requiring the cognitive practices of insight and perspective-taking, it entails 
the emotional processes of fully experiencing and regulating emotions (Slade, 2005; 
Benbassat & Priel, 2012). This simultaneous emotional and thoughtful commitment to 
self and other understanding is what makes mentalization such an inherent part of 
attachment relationships. 
Mentalization has been more broadly researched than either mind-mindedness or 
PMEP. The greater ubiquity of mentalization in the empirical research can be partly 
understood by its theoretical breadth. Like PMEP but unlike mind-mindedness, it is 
viewed as a capacity that includes a way of relating to the self as well as to the other, and 
includes an emotional component as well as a cognitive one. As a result, it is a process 
that has been found attractive to researchers in diverse niches of the field, ranging from 
neuroscientists to psychoanalysts (Bateman & Fonagy, 2013).  
Furthermore, unlike both mind-mindedness and PMEP, it does not refer only to 
the parent-child relationship, but to a more broad-ranging capacity to view others as 
intentional beings. As a result, it has emerged as a potential core process in a variety of 
therapies and its role in the treatment of various psychopathologies has been a fruitful 
topic of investigation for the last two decades. This makes it a particularly useful 
construct in that where deficits in mentalization are discovered, there can be the direct 
and immediate hope of addressing this deficit through therapies that have been 
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empirically demonstrated to increase mentalization capacities (e.g. Minding the baby, 
Slade et al., 2005a; Mentalization Based Therapy, Bateman & Fonagy, 2013).   
Another potential reason for the relative popularity of mentalization is its 
empirical relationship to other established measures and constructs. The 
operationalization of mentalization in attachment contexts, termed Reflective Function 
(RF) has been shown to be correlated with the Adult Attachment Interview in studies 
where mind-mindedness was not (Fonagy, Steele & Steele, 1991; Rosenblum, 
McDonough, Sameroff & Muzik. 2008). As a result, mentalization has emerged as a 
major factor in explaining the transmission of attachment from one generation to the next 
(Benbassat and Priel, 2012; Rosenblum et al., 2008; Slade et al., 2005b) a crucially 
important budding area of research.  
 Some of the primary arenas of mentalization research- attachment, self 
development, and the risk for psychopathology- will be presented below, following a full 
introduction of Reflective Function as the measure of mentalization.  
  
 Reflective Function 
Reflective function refers to the extent that people can mentalize with regard to 
their internalized representations of their attachment relationships. It is measured in two 
ways. Adult reflective function is measured with a coding system that is applied to the 
AAI, and parental reflective function is now measured utilizing the Parent Development 
Interview.  
Adults have been found to differ extremely in the extent to which they mentalize 
about their attachment relationships. When asked to examine 200 AAI transcripts of 
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mothers and fathers, raters found distinct levels of evidence for reflectiveness across 
individuals. Several subjects displayed only the lowest level of reflectiveness, such as 
platitudes and general statements such as “one must try to appreciate others’ point of 
view” (Fonagy et al., 1991b, p. 210). Other individuals’ AAI transcripts evidenced 
moderate evidence of reflectiveness, such as genuine psychological statements that were 
nevertheless generalized and not unique to the individuals in question. Finally, some 
demonstrate evidence of reflectiveness including understanding of both conscious and 
unconscious thoughts and feelings influencing the behavior of both self and others 
(Fonagy et al., 1991b). These observations are what led to the development of the 
Reflective Function scale by Fonagy and colleagues. The existence of a range of 
reflective capacities among individuals is supported by the consistent observation of a 
normal distribution of scores on the RF scales and high interrater reliabilities in studies 
utilizing the RF scale (e.g. Benabassat & Priel, 2012; Gergely & Unoka, 2008; Slade et 
al., 2005b). Fonagy et al., (1991b) in the pioneering study, found an interrater reliability 
of .7 for mothers’ transcripts and .75 for fathers’ transcripts.  
The Reflective Function scale that is applied to the AAI focuses on the 
individual’s ability to think about his/her own feelings, as well as those of his/her parents. 
It specifically considers an adult’s awareness of how mental states work and his/her 
application of mental state explanations of behavior, among other factors (Slade, 2005).  
As the study of Reflective Function in parents per se has become increasingly 
popular, researchers have turned to what is believed to be a more direct measure of 
parental reflective functioning, the Parent Development Interview (Aber et al., 1985).  
This interview, like the AAI, is a semi-structured interview that measures a parent’s 
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internal working models of relationships. Consisting of 45 questions, the PDI specifically 
addresses parent’s representations of their relationships with their children, of their 
children as individuals, and of themselves as parents (Slade, 2005). The application of the 
RF scale to the PDI is believed to shed light on individual differences in mentalizing 
within the parent-child relationship that are general and stable. Quite distinct from the 
measures of mind-mindedness and parental meta-emotion philosophy that measure parent 
behavior in a given interaction, reflective function measures mentalization taking place 
not in that moment but rather, ‘off-line’ (Sharp & Fonagy, 2008). The RF Scale applied 
to the PDI is intended to measure a parent’s principal stance toward their child as an 
intentional or psychological being. It is assumed that this general attitude thus informs the 
parent’s behavior toward the child across multiple interactions over time (Sharp & 
Fonagy, 2008).  
A normal distribution of parent reflectiveness was observed by Slade et al., 
(2005b) in using the modified RF scale applied to the PDI. In applying the RF Scale to 
parent narratives about their children, Slade et al. (2005b) observed the following 
manifestations of different levels of reflectiveness. Parents who were classified as low in 
RF spoke about their child in such a way that suggested that the parent was unaware of 
the fact that their child even had thoughts and feelings. Other examples of low RF 
included discussion of a child’s behavior in terms of stable personality traits rather than 
internal states. Parents considered to have low RF also demonstrated low levels of 
awareness about and reflection upon their own internal states (Slade, 2005). Parents who 
evidenced moderate levels of RF recognized the existence of their children’s internal 
states but did not connect those states to their own behavior and interaction with the child 
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(Slade, 2005). Finally, on the high RF end of the spectrum, parents showed keen 
awareness of their children as intentional beings. These parents drew connections 
between their own internal states, their behavior, and the mental states and behavior of 
their children.  
The drastically different stances adopted by parents with different levels of 
parental RF have a large impact on their children’s socio-emotional development. The 
following sections will explore the ways in which parental RF has been linked to both 
parent and child attachment status, as well as child risk for psychopathology and self 
development.  
 
Attachment and Mentalization 
 Attachment and mentalization support one another in a reciprocal relationship. 
This relationship is further buffered by neural associations, and by the assumption that 
attachment relationships have the evolutionary function of facilitating social cognitive 
skills (Fonagy, 2006). The nature of this reciprocal relationship is a complex one, but one 
that is bolstered by a significant amount of empirical evidence as well as common-sense 
theory. The key elements of the interrelationship between attachment and mentalization 
are presented in this section.  
Parental Reflective Function and Adult Attachment Classification 
 Parents who are rated high in Reflective Function have been shown to be more 
likely to receive a secure/autonomous classification on the AAI. Fonagy et al. (1991b) in 
their pioneering study of Reflective Function, found that RF was related to the 
dimensions that are used to rate the AAI. The strongest correlation was between RF and 
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coherence, which has been found to be the best single indicator of AAI classification, as 
well as of child attachment status (Fonagy et al., 1991c; Ainsworth & Eichberg, 1990; 
Main et al., 1985). Arnott and Meins (2007) replicated Fonagy’s result, showing that in a 
sample of mothers and fathers from the northeast of England, both mothers and fathers 
who were classified as autonomous on the AAI had significantly higher RF scores than 
mothers and fathers classified as non-autonomous. In both of these studies, AAI and RF 
were both coded using the same data set of AAI transcripts.  
 Slade et al., (2005b) further demonstrated a connection between RF and AAI 
classification, and in this case RF was established using the PDI. They found that 
autonomous mothers had significantly higher RF scores than mothers classified as 
dismissing, preoccupied, and/or unresolved. Furthermore, both dismissing and 
preoccupied mothers had higher RF scores than mothers in the unresolved group. 
ANOVA analyses of the RF differences between mothers were significant both for the 
four attachment categories and the dichotomous autonomous/nonautonomous 
categorization. These findings established that a mother’s attachment status assessed 
during pregnancy was strongly able to predict maternal reflective functioning as 
measured by the PDI when the infant was 10 months old.  
Parental Mentalization and Parent-Infant Attachment 
 In multiple studies, parental mentalization has also been shown to predict secure 
attachment between the parent and infant in the strange situation at one year (Fonagy et 
al., 1991c; Slade et al., 2005b; Meins et al., 2001; Karen-Korie et al., 2002 as cited in 
Fonagy & Target, 2005). This connection is consistent across multiple measures of 
parental mentalization, including RF measured with both the AAI and PDI, as well as 
	   21	  
mind-mindedness measured in live interactions between mothers and children (Meins et 
al., 2012; Meins et al., 2002; Meins, 1997). Furthermore, parental mentalization has been 
shown to predict secure attachment in both mothers and fathers (Arnott & Meins, 2007).  
 Grienenberger, Kelly and Slade (2005) found that the relationship between 
maternal RF and infant-mother attachment security was mediated by the affective 
communication between mother and infant. This sheds light on one of the potential 
mechanisms through which RF is linked to secure attachment. More insight into the 
parent behaviors that could be responsible for the connection between parent 
mentalization and infant attachment is provided by the finding that mothers’ 
appropriate/accurate mind-related comments were positively correlated with infant 
attachment security while mothers’ inappropriate/inaccurate comments were negatively 
correlated with infant attachment security. In other words, parents who rate higher in 
mentalization may promote secure attachment relationships with their infants by more 
accurately commenting on their infants’ minds (Arnott & Meins, 2007). Later studies 
have replicated this finding. For example, Meins et al., (2012) found that both maternal 
appropriate mind-related comments and non-attuned mind-related comments in a free-
play session with their 8-month old infants each independently predicted mother- infant 
attachment security when the infants were 15 months old.  
 Other studies linking parent mentalization with parent-infant attachment have 
focused on parental sensitivity as a potential mechanism for the effects. Cheung (2015, as 
cited in Zeegers, Colonnesi, Stams & Meins, 2017) demonstrated that mentalization 
predicted attachment security independently of parent sensitivity, although more strongly 
so when parent sensitivity was not controlled for.  
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 These findings do not only tell a story about attachment security and how to 
predict it. They also shed light on less favorable attachment classifications, including 
disorganized attachment. For example, Slade et al. (2005b) found that a group of infants 
classified as disorganized had mothers whose RF scores were a standard deviation below 
those whose infants were classified as secure. Similarly, Schechter et al. (2005) found 
that in a traumatized population, relatively poor maternal reflective function predicted 
negativity and distortions in attributions about the infant. This finding was independent of 
the extent of interpersonal violence suffered by the mothers in the study, and also of the 
extent of maternal PTSD. Finally, parents with disorganized attachments to their children 
have been shown to depict their children as not having thoughts and feelings that can be 
taken into account (Slade, 2005). 
 Although there is a strong case for mentalization and attachment going hand in 
hand, there is also some evidence that the relationship may be more complex. Arnott and 
Meins (2007) found that in the case of parents with non-autonomous AAI classifications, 
infants were more likely to be securely attached to their parents if the parents 
demonstrated high levels of mind-mindedness. As such, parental mind-mindedness could 
be a buffer against poor child outcomes such as insecure attachment (Arnott & Meins, 
2007).  
Parent-Infant Attachment and Child Mentalization/ Theory of Mind 
 Secure attachment is theorized to be conducive to the development of 
mentalization in the child. Empirical findings indeed demonstrate that secure attachment 
may facilitate developmental achievements in the social-emotional domain. Securely 
attached infants have been shown to develop theory of mind earlier (Meins, 1997) and to 
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demonstrate more signs of having a reflective self in early childhood, including engaging 
in more self-talk during toddlerhood and making more spontaneous self-reflective 
comments at six years old (Main, Hesse & Kaplan, 1995).  
  Steele, Steele, Croft & Fonagy (1999) found that children who were securely 
attached at 12 months of age demonstrated better understanding of mixed emotions five 
years later, at the age of 6, than did children who had been insecurely attached at 12 
months. In fact, when entered into a regression analysis with other factors including the 
child’s age, only attachment status with mother significantly predicted mixed-emotion 
understanding. Fonagy, Redfern and Charman (1997) also established a link between 
attachment status and reflective functioning. In their study, attachment was measured 
using the semi-projective Separation Anxiety Test (SAT) in children aged 3-6. They 
found that the children with secure SAT attachment were more likely to pass a belief-
desire reasoning task (a measure of theory of mind) than those with ambiguous and 
insecure SAT attachment status. Again, the attachment status was the only significant 
predictor of theory of mind when entered into a regression analysis with other factors- in 
this case verbal IQ and a teacher’s relative ranking of social maturity. Finally, de Rosnay 
and Harris (2002) looked at the performances of children aged 3-6 on two emotion-
understanding tasks along with their concurrent SAT attachment status. They found that 
overall attachment security as assessed on the SAT made a significant contribution to 
emotion understanding.  
 It is important to mention that it is not universally believed that theory of mind 
development can be influenced by attachment relationships. Baron-Cohen (1995) and 
Avis & Harris (1991) suggest that theory of mind development is fixed and universal, and 
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therefore impervious to influences from the social environment. However, one large twin 
study found that environmental factors indeed explained much of the variance in 
children’s performance in a theory of mind task (Hughes et al., 2005). Additionally, there 
have been countless empirical studies linking factors related to the social environment to 
children’s emotion understanding, including family emotion talk (e.g. Dunn et al., 1991a; 
Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla & Youngblade, 1991), mother-child emotion talk 
(Farrant, Maybery & Fletcher, 2013); and parental emotional availability (e.g. Denham et 
al., 1994; Eisenberg et al., 1998) just to name a few. Nevertheless, some more recent 
empirical studies that have considered both the effects of parent mentalization (mind-
mindedness) and attachment security on children’s theory of mind performance have 
found that attachment was not, in fact, a strong predictor of child theory of mind 
performance (Laranjo, Bernier, Meins & Carlson, 2010; Laranjo, Bernier, Miens & 
Carlson, 2014). Alongside the controversy in the empirical literature, theoretical 
knowledge about the processes through which mentalization develops posits that secure 
attachments are conducive to emotion understanding and mentalization.  
The Development of Mentalization in the Child 
While the ability to develop mentalization is present in all human infants, the 
social environment determines the course of its development (Fonagy, 2002). The infant 
comes to think of others’ minds through the process of being understood and responded 
to as a person with a mind in his own right (Fonagy & Target, 2005). Specifically, when a 
caregiver holds in her mind the reasons for her infant’s behavior, she represents these in 
her behavior toward the infant. Through these interactions the child learns that mental 
states exist, and comes to recognize them in himself and then in others (Slade, 2005). In 
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this way, the development of mentalization goes hand in hand with the consolidation of a 
sense of self, as will be further explicated below. It is noteworthy, too, that in addition to 
appreciating her child’s mental state, a parent must be able to contain her child’s 
emotional experiences in order for mentalization to develop successfully (Benbassat & 
Priel, 2012).  
 Parents’ ability to mentalize must be seen as existing on a continuum. As Fonagy 
et al., (1991b) observed, individuals vary in their overall proclivity to interpret their 
child’s behavior in terms of internal states. However, at the same time, there are 
inevitably variations within the individual that are influenced by a wide range of 
contextual factors, emotional, situational, and otherwise. For parsimony, the research 
findings presented in this and other sections refer to parents’ mentalization capacities as 
low, moderate or high. These categorizations refer to the preponderance of either 
adaptive or poor mentalizing within an individual.  
 Parents who are well-attuned to their children’s internal states are able to more 
accurately interpret their children’s intentions and express interest in doing so (Fonagy, 
2006). Consistent with this notion, mothers with higher RF scores have been shown to 
utilize more mind-minded comments about their child’s mind (Rosenblum et al., 2008). 
Parents who are accurately tuned in to their children’s mental states also will have 
thoughts that are more benign, such that the children can have a healthy interest in and 
fearlessly come to know the content of their caregiver’s minds (Fonagy, 2006). These 
highly reflective parents are also more likely to engage in mentalizing-promoting 
activities such as pretend play (Fonagy, 2006.)  
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 On the other end of the spectrum, parents with less developed mentalizing 
capacities may not be able to mirror their children’s affect in a way that is conducive to 
containment or to the development of mentalizing capacities in the child. Slade (2005) 
identified two ways that this may commonly occur. Parents may respond to the infant’s 
fear with fear of their own, which can make fear unsafe to experience and hard to 
symbolize in words. Parents may also inaccurately interpret an infant’s intention (for 
example imagining that the child is trying to manipulate the parent) leading the parent to 
enact a response that does not match the child’s actual intention. In this situation, the 
child does not come to know the actual content of his own mind, undermining his 
eventual ability to mentalize. Similarly, parents who have been the victims of relational 
trauma may have shut down their own thinking about their own and other’s mental states, 
because doing so has at times been dangerous (Fonagy, 2006). Research supporting these 
ideas has shown that children with histories of sexual abuse had mentalization difficulties 
(Ensink et al., 2015). Furthermore, maltreating parents have been shown to have 
difficulties understanding their children’s emotions (Shipman & Zeman, 2001) and may 
engage their children less often in emotional discussions (Edwards, Shipman & Brown, 
2005). 
 In sum, mentalization in children is supported by parent behaviors that are 
indicative both of parent reflective capacities and conducive to the creation of a secure 
and safe attachment to the child. This is part of the reason why mentalization has recently 
been put forth as a potential mechanism for the transmission of attachment from parent to 
child.  
RF as a mediator in the Intergenerational Transmission of Attachment  
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Given that attachment has been shown in twin studies to have minimal 
heritability, it appears that environmental factors are largely responsible for the 
transmission of secure attachment from parent to child (Fonagy & Target, 2005). 
Moreover, parents can be understood to be more responsible for the nature of the parent-
child relationship than are children, leaving the question of how parents transmit their 
mental representations of attachment to their children of paramount importance (van 
IJzendoorn, 1995.)  
 Slade (2005) has provided strong evidence for the potential role of mentalization 
in transmitting attachment from parent to child. She found that maternal RF was related 
both to adult attachment assessed during pregnancy and infant attachment assessed at one 
year of age. Preliminary analyses supported the hypothesis that parental RF is a crucial 
mediator in the intergenerational transmission of attachment. Arnott and Meins (2007) 
replicated this, in finding that all infants in their study who had a parent that was both 
classified as secure/autonomous and shown to be high in mind-mindedness was securely 
attached to their parent. On the other side, most infants whose parent was non-
autonomous and low in mind-mindedness were insecurely attached. It is hypothesized 
that secure attachment status for the mother allows her to feel safe and able to explore her 
own mind, and that of her infant. In turn, the mother’s awareness of her infant leads the 
way for interactions that help the infant to develop his own stable psychological self 
(Fonagy & Target, 2005.)  
 Unfortunately, since 2005 there have not been any new studies looking at 
mentalization as a possible mechanism for the intergenerational transmission of 
attachment (Sette, Coppola & Cassibba, 2015). Those studies that have considered 
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potential mechanisms for the transmission of attachment have predominantly focused on 
parental sensitivity and other parenting behaviors (Verhage et al., 2016).  
  
Mentalization and Psychopathology 
 Studies show that inaccurate or absent parent mentalizing is correlated with poor 
child outcomes. Inaccurate mentalizing in parents can set off a chain reaction of events. 
One study found that mothers whose inaccurate mentalization led them to interpret their 
children’s negative behavior as willful and indicative of negative personality dispositions 
were themselves more upset about this negative behavior (Dix & Lochman, 1990). In 
turn, this would have affected the mother’s own intrapersonal emotional response and the 
part of her emotional response directed toward her child (Sharp & Fonagy, 2008). It is 
known from Gottman’s research on PMEP that parent affect and affect regulation 
influence a parent’s mentalization of their child’s mind (e.g. Gottman et al., 1996). In 
short, inaccurate parent mentalizing can lead to parent upset, which then could set the 
stage for further limitations in mentalizing of the child’s mind.  
 Another example of the potential ill effects of inaccurate parent mentalizing can 
be found in the literature on the hostile attribution bias- showing that mothers who have 
this bias and are more likely to interpret their children’s intentions as hostile are also 
more likely to have aggressive children (Strassberg, 1997).  
In addition to inaccurate mentalization, it is known that an absence of 
mentalization by attachment figures is also detrimental to children. In cases of abuse and 
neglect in which caregivers are not available for interpreting their children’s mind, 
children show poor emotion discrimination (Edwards et al., 2005; Pollak, Cicchetti, 
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Hornung, & Reed, 2000) and delays in theory of mind development (Cicchetti, Rogosch, 
Maughan, Toth, & Bruce, 2003; Pears & Fisher, 2005) and emotional understanding 
(Camras, Sachs-Alter, & Ribordy, 1996; Rogosch, Cicchetti, & Aber, 1995; Shipman & 
Zeman, 1999). In the case of abuse by a caregiver, the attempt to know that caregiver’s 
mind, including their intentions, thoughts and feelings, can be fear-inducing and 
dangerous, leading children to flee from any attempt at doing so (Tuber, Boesch, Gorkin 
and Terry, 2014; Fonagy et al., 2002). Consistent with this, in her dissertation research, 
Srinivasan (2006) found that survivors of severe child abuse had poor reflective 
functioning as adults.  
As this body of literature shows, there are risks associated with the absence of a 
caregiver who can mentalize the child’s mind with good-enough accuracy. However, it is 
not necessarily the case that the more reflective the parent, the more positive outcomes 
we can expect for the child. Indeed, Benbassat and Priel (2012) found that paternal 
reflective function levels, specifically, were positively correlated with the internalizing 
problems of their adolescent-aged children. Although in this study the internalizing 
problems reported did not reach the clinical range, it is important to consider that there 
are implications for psychopathology on both ends of the mentalization spectrum.    
Recent studies have established associations between lower levels of 
mentalization and various psychopathological conditions. In their review, Jewell et al. 
(2015) found strong evidence for an association between problems with mentalization 
and eating disorder pathology. They also found that adolescents with anorexia appear to 
be challenged in the skill of emotion recognition. Similarly, Kuipers, van Loenhout, van 
der Ark & Bekker (2016) found that compared with healthy controls, eating disorder 
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patients demonstrated a lower level of mentalization. Furthermore, within the clinical 
population of patients with eating disorders, self-injurious behavior was associated with 
lower mentalization.  
The long-theorized link between deficits in mentalization and borderline 
personality disorder (BPD) was recently empirically supported by Petersen, Brakoulias & 
Langdon, 2015. They found that while people diagnosed with BPD did not differ from 
healthy controls in performing simple mentalization tasks, patients with BPD showed 
mentalization deficits in comparison with healthy controls when performing complex 
mentalization tasks that required the integration of multiple components. Furthermore, as 
the childhood experiences of punishment increased, adult mentalization ability decreased. 
The importance of mentalization as a predictive factor for psychopathology is 
further supported by Chiesa and Fonagy (2014)’s finding that RF mediated the 
relationship between childhood adversity and psychiatric distress later in life, with higher 
RF decreasing the likelihood of later psychiatric distress.  
 
Mentalization and Self-Development 
 It would be remiss to present an overview of the important implications of 
mentalization capacities without including the formative role that mentalization plays in 
the development of a secure sense of self. Because the self develops in close conversation 
with attachment figures, it is reflective function in particular that is crucial for self 
development. High reflectiveness on the part of the mother is believed to foster both 
autonomy and self-regulation in the child (Fonagy et al., 2002). Several practices that can 
be believed to occur within relationships where mentalization is strong may lend 
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themselves to successful self-development. For example, the co-construction of 
narratives about emotionally significant events has been shown to facilitate 
autobiographical memory, which is known to be crucial for self development (Bettens, 
Favez & Stern, 2003; Laible, Murphy & Augustine, 2013; Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 
2013, as cited in Ensink et al., 2015).  
 As stated above, a child learns to know his own mind by being treated as someone 
with a mind. In other words, his caregiver’s mirroring and reflection of his inner states 
become the basis for his understanding that he has a mind and for beginning to know its 
inner workings. From these early glimpses into his own mind, a core self develops 
(Fonagy & Target, 2006).  
 The importance of mentalization for self-development is underscored by the 
deficits in self-development that occur in the absence of mentalization within the 
attachment relationship. For example, children who suffer abuse and neglect have been 
shown to have delays in self-recognition in the mirror between 18 and 30 months of age 
(Schneider-Rosen & Cicchetti, 1991). Furthermore, there is a prevalence of dissociation 
in children who have suffered relational trauma in the context of their early attachment 
relationships, and dissociation is a threat to an integrated sense of self and well-
established subjectivity (Tuber et al., 2014).  
 
Parental Mentalization and Child Theory of Mind/Mentalization Capacities 
  There is a significant body of research that suggests that the way parents interact 
with their children vis a vis emotions can have important effects on children’s emotion 
knowledge and related factors. Early studies by Carole Dunn and her colleagues 
	   32	  
demonstrated that family environments in which feelings were more openly discussed 
and causal state language was used were conducive to Theory of Mind development in 
children (Dunn et al., 1991a; Dunn et al., 1991b). Others have similarly shown that 
parental discussion, rather than avoidance, of emotions, can facilitate children’s 
understanding of their own and others’ minds (Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002; 
Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2008). In a crucial study in this area, Meins et al., (1998) found 
that 3 year-old children whose mothers were more likely to describe them in terms of 
their mental states rather than their behavior or physical appearance were more successful 
on mentalizing tasks at the ages of 4 and 5. Additionally, children who anticipate a non-
supportive parental response to their expression of negative emotions have been shown to 
evidence lower social and emotional competencies (Gergely & Unoka, 2008; Denham et 
al., 1994; Eisenberg et al., 1998).  
 Four recent studies in particular have found preliminary evidence for the main 
hypothesis of the current research- that mentalization capacities are linked in parents and 
children. Benbassat and Priel (2012) found a correlation between the RF levels of parents 
and their adolescent children. This association was observed both for mothers and fathers. 
In this particular study, RF was assessed in parents using the PDI and RF scale, and in the 
adolescent population RF was measured using the Child Attachment Index (CAI) (Target, 
Fonagy & Shmueli-Goetz, 2003). Benbassat and Priel (2012) also found that several of 
the other outcome variables that they considered were moderated by parental RF. 
Specifically, parental warmth was associated with high levels of social self-perception in 
adolescents only in the presence of high parental RF. Furthermore, paternal control was 
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linked to lower levels of adolescent self-perception and high levels of externalizing, but 
only in the case where paternal RF was also low.  
 Another study that lends direct support to the present hypothesis was performed 
by Ensink et al. (2015). Like Benbassat and Priel (2012) Ensink et al. (2015) used the 
PDI and RF scale that will be used in the present research. They used a newly developed 
RF scale for children in conjunction with the CAI. As predicted, Ensink et al. (2015) 
found a correlation between the RF levels of parents and children aged 9 and 10. From 
this they concluded: “it is possible to reliably measure mentalization in children aged 7-
12 from the narratives they produce regarding themselves and their relationships with 
attachment figures” (p. 212). The present research aims to replicate this result with a 
different measure of child reflective function.  
 In a longitudinal study, Meins et al. (2002) investigated the transmission of 
mentalization from parents to children. They found that the use of appropriate mental 
state commentary by mothers in interactions with their children when they were 6 months 
old predicted children’s theory of mind performance at age 4. Meins et al., (2002) found 
that only appropriate mental state language by parents predicted better theory of mind 
scores by children, as opposed to simply the more frequent use of mental state language 
in general. In other words, it is not enough for parents to simply use mental state 
language; mental state language must also be attuned to the child’s actual internal world. 
This suggests that studying mentalization in the context of attachment relationships is 
particularly worthwhile and important. Finally, Meins et al. (2013) replicated this result 
in a second longitudinal study, finding that appropriate mind-minded comments made 
during a free- play session when children were 8 months old predicted children’s theory 
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of mind performance at 51 months of age. The present research may be able to shed light 
on the mechanism through which these powerful effects may occur.  
  
Present Research 
 In the vein of the studies presented above, the present research proposes to 
investigate the transmission of mentalization capacities from parent to child. Much of the 
research looking at mentalization in the context of attachment has focused on very young 
children. However, there is evidence for the transmission of mentalization from parents to 
children in middle childhood (Ensink et al., 2015) and adolescence (Benbassat & Priel, 
2012). The current research is unique in examining the mentalization capacities of 
ranging in age from early childhood to adolescence.  
The population of this study is also remarkable in that it represents a child clinical 
population. There is a dearth of research looking at mentalization in children presenting 
with psychological distress. Given the established role of mentalization as a mediating 
factor between adversity and psychopathology, an investigation of mentalization in a 
child clinical population is important for its potential to shed light on this phenomenon.  
As discussed above, mentalization involves two distinct aspects, one that involves 
self-understanding and regulation and another that has to do with taking the perspective 
of others. There is some evidence for the fact that self-understanding is considered a 
more complex developmental achievement, and recent evidence that self and other 
understanding involve distinct, although proximal, neural networks (Bogdan, 2004 and 
Lieberman, 2007 as cited in Ensink, 2015). For example, Ensink et al. (2015) found that 
while maternal RF was associated with both self and other RF in children, it only 
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independently contributed to explaining the variance in self RF in their sample of 
sexually abused children. This powerful finding showed that maternal RF has important 
predictive validity related to self -RF in children even when mentalization development is 
disrupted by something like sexual abuse. Given these findings, children’s mentalization 
capacities with regard to the self and those that pertain to the other will each be separately 
considered, in addition to overall mentalization capacities.  
In the present study, as in several of the studies cited above, parental 
mentalization will be assessed using the Reflective Function (RF) scale applied to the 
Parent Development Interview (PDI). Children’s mentalization capacities will be 
measured on the basis of their narrative descriptions of thoughts and feelings as part of a 
storytelling task. The concordance of mentalization capacities within a parent-child dyad 
can thus be considered. It is hypothesized that parent reflective function and child 
mentalization capacities will be shown to be positively correlated with one another, 
demonstrating that in dyads where the parent exhibits a higher level of mentalization 
about the child, the child also is better able to mentalize.  
 
METHODS 
 
Participants 
Participants in this study were 15 parent-child dyads taken from a larger sample 
of patients at The Psychological Center, a community mental health clinic that serves as 
the training clinic for doctoral students in clinical psychology at City College. The larger 
sample includes all children who underwent an intake process at The Psychological 
Center during the years from 2009-2016, as well as their parents. The participants for the 
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current research study were selected from the larger sample exclusively on the basis of 
data availability. All dyads in which both data measures of interest were completed have 
been included in the present study. The children represent a clinical population in that at 
the time of data collection they were undergoing an intake at The Psychological Center, a 
community mental health clinic.  
 
Procedure 
Data utilized for this study belongs to a pre-existing data set collected by Arietta 
Slade and Steve Tuber at the City College of New York. All measures were administered 
to children and their parents as part of the intake procedure for children entering 
treatment at The Psychological Center at City College. Consent was obtained by the 
intake clinician, who also completed the parent interview (The Parent Development 
Interview- PDI). A second student therapist conducted the Thematic Apperception Test-
TAT- with the child. This measure was given following the administration of two other 
measures- the Ravens Progressive Matrices Test and the Rorschach Inkblot Method.   
 
Measures 
Parent Development Interview (PDI)  
The Parent Development Interview is a 45-question semi-structured clinical 
interview. Questions range from asking for descriptions of the child to aspects of the 
child that are particularly enjoyable or difficult for the parent. Parents are also asked to 
describe themselves as parents and to compare and contrast their parenting to that of their 
own parents. As such, the PDI measures a parent’s mental representation of their 
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children, of themselves as parents, and of their relationships with their children. The PDI 
has been shown to have strong construct, predictive and convergent validity (Slade, 
Belsky, Aber & Phelps, 1999; Aber et al., 1999).  It also has very strong reliability (Slade 
et al., 2005b).  
Reflective Function Scale  
Parental reflective function will be measured utilizing The Addendum to the 
Reflective Functioning Scoring Manual, which was developed for specific use with the 
PDI (Slade et al., 2004b). The addendum accompanies the RF coding manual developed 
by Fonagy and colleagues for use with the AAI (Fonagy et al., 1998). The RF scale is an 
11-point scale ranging from -1 (negative RF) to 9 (exceptional RF). Scores below 5 
indicate negative, absent or low RF while scores above 5 provide clear evidence of 
mentalizing capacities (Slade et al., 2005). RF on the PDI is assessed in the following 
four categories: 1. Awareness of the nature of mental states, 2. The effort to identify the 
mental states that pertain to behavior, 3. Recognition of the developmental aspect of 
mental states, and 4. Mental states as they arise in connection to the interviewer (Slade et 
al. 2005b).  
RF scores are ascertained for 21 questions on the PDI, and an overall score is 
given to each interview as a whole.  Answers characterized as having high RF involve 
recognition of mental states both within the self and the child. These answers also 
demonstrate an awareness of how mental states and behavior interact, and an appreciation 
of the child’s developmental stage and limitations. Answers characterized as having low 
RF may be concrete, superficial, or banal, and tend to disavow the importance or the 
existence of internal states (Fonagy & Target, 2005).  
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Scoring was applied to verbatim transcripts created from audio files of the 
interviews. Interviews were coded by an expert coder with extensive experience applying 
the RF scale to the PDI.  
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) 
 The TAT (Morgan & Murray, 1935) is a projective storytelling test. Participants 
are presented with black and white pictures depicting various scenes, many of which are 
morose in nature. Participants are asked to state five things about each picture: (1) what is 
happening in the picture, (2) what happened prior to the scene shown in the picture, (3) 
what will happen in the future, (4) what the characters are thinking, and (5) what the 
characters are feeling. The TAT is used by clinicians as a means of ascertaining 
information about the individual’s internal representations of self, other, as well as their 
primary affects and defensive constellations (Tuber, 2012).  
The TAT is a measure that may be particularly conducive to the study of 
mentalization. As Tuber (2012) pointed out, the demands that the TAT makes on the 
participant are remarkably similar to those required by the AAI (and the conceptually 
related PDI). Like the AAI, the TAT necessitates that the subject create a story that 
coherently links the present to the past. Furthermore, the clinical index of psychological 
health on the TAT is unrelated to the content of the stories per say. Just as a secure 
classification on the AAI does not indicate a happier childhood or even a secure 
relationship with caregivers in childhood, a healthy TAT story is not defined by whether 
its resolution is happy and positive (Tuber, 2012).  Finally, given that the TAT also 
requires that participants discuss the internal states of the characters, it can be seen as a 
task that inherently assesses “psychological mindedness” and the participant’s ability to 
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engage in “emotional problem solving” (Tuber, 2012, pp. 118-119). All of these factors 
combine to make the use of the TAT with the SCORS a recommended measure for the 
present research.  
Social Cognition and Object Relations Scale (SCORS)  
 The SCORS (Stein, Hilsenroth, Slavin-Mulford & Pinsker, 2011; Westen, 2002) 
is a coding system that is applied to the TAT and used to index both cognitive and 
affective components of an individual’s object relations. The SCORS was conceptualized 
on the basis of object relations and attachment theories. It was developed to assess 
dimensions of internal representations of relationships using narratives such as TAT 
stories (Niec & Russ, 2002). Given that the PDI measures internal representations of 
relationships, the SCORS is believed to measure a comparable construct. Furthermore, by 
assessing both emotional and cognitive elements of representations, the SCORS 
encompasses both dimensions addressed by the RF Scale as applied to the PDI. The 
SCORS has been shown to be a reliable and valid measure for use with clinical 
populations and with children, and is therefore appropriate for the present sample (Stein, 
Slavin-Mulford, Sinclair, Siefert & Blais, 2012; Niec & Russ, 2002; Ordnuff & Kelsey, 
1996.) Finally, the SCORS has been chosen as a measure for this study because it was 
developed for use with the TAT. 
 The SCORS is comprised of 8 clinician-rated variables. Each variable is scored 
on a 7-point rating scale, with lower scores indicating greater pathology and high scores 
indicative of better overall psychological health. The 8 variables are: ‘Complexity of 
Object Relations,’ ‘Affective Quality of Representations,’ ‘Emotional Investment in 
Relationships,’ ‘Emotional Investment in Moral Standards,’ ‘Understanding of Social 
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Causality,’ ‘Experience and Regulation of Aggressive Impulses,’ ‘Self-esteem,’ and 
‘Identity and Coherence of Self.’  
In past research, the SCORS has often been utilized as a measure of individual 
differences, focused on differentiating clinical and nonclinical groups (Kelly, 2007). For 
example, Westen, Lohr, Silk, Gold & Kerber (1990) identified patterns of SCORS 
responses that could distinguish adolescents diagnosed as having Borderline personality 
disorder from adolescents diagnosed with depression, and from those not carrying a 
psychiatric diagnosis. Similarly, Defife, Goldberg & Westen (2015) found that 
adolescents who met criteria for a personality disorder diagnosis had more pathological 
scores on the SCORS scales than peers. A SCORS composite variable was able to 
discriminate adolescents carrying a personality disorder diagnosis from those who did 
not.  
 In addition to discriminating among clinical and nonclinical children/adolescents, 
other studies have turned to comparing groups of children on the basis of exposure to risk 
factors for psychopathology. A series of studies by Ornduff and colleagues found that 
children and adolescents who had suffered physical and sexual abuse demonstrated 
impairments in object relations (lower scores on the SCORS scales) compared to non-
abused peers (Ornduff, 1997) and that the SCORS could meaningfully distinguish 
between abused and nonabused children and adolescents (Ornduff, 1996; see also 
Ornduff, 2003). Furthermore, Ornduff and colleagues were able to identify consistent 
differences in SCORS performance on the basis of type of abuse. While physically 
abused children achieved lower scores on all SCORS scales, sexually abused children 
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demonstrated a particularly impaired performance on affective aspects of object relations 
measured by the SCORS (Kelly, 1997).  
A separate body of research using the SCORS with children and adolescents has 
worked to establish that the SCORS can be used not only to demonstrate between 
individual differences but also as a developmental measure. When developing the 
SCORS, Westen (1991) believed that in theory the scales should be developmental in 
nature, with the exception of the ‘Affective Quality of Relationships’ scale. Indeed, 
several studies have validated this, finding for example that 4th graders outperform 3rd 
graders on all scales other than the Affect scale (Niec & Russ, 2002) and that 12th graders 
outperform 9th graders, and 5th graders outperform 2nd graders (Westen et al., 1991). 
Taken together, these studies demonstrate that object relations develop beyond early 
childhood, and thus should be studied in later childhood and even early adolescence, as is 
done in the current research.  
 As stated above, the SCORS has been shown to be psychometrically sound. Niec 
and Russ (2002) found that all of the scales of the SCORS, as predicted, were 
significantly intercorrelated. The authors furthermore demonstrated convergent validity 
in showing that three of the dimensions of internal representations were correlated with 
measures of empathy and the quality of pretend play in 8-10 year-old children (Niec & 
Russ, 2002). Further extending the validity of the SCORS to a clinical population, Stein 
et al., (2012) demonstrated that the SCORS displayed good internal consistency as well 
as high interrater reliability in a sample of 59 patients referred to a hospital for 
assessment. Stein et al., (2012) also demonstrated that the SCORS components were 
appropriately related to various aspects of cognitive and personality functioning.  
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Data Analysis 
 The relationship between the two variables in this study will be measured using a 
correlation analysis. It is hypothesized that parent and child reflective function will be 
positively and significantly associated as demonstrated by positive correlations between 
parent reflective functioning and child scores on each of the SCORS scales.  
 
Aims and Hypotheses 
1. The primary hypothesis is that parents who score higher on the RF Scale applied 
to the PDI will have children who score higher on the SCORS as applied to the 
TAT. In other words, there will be a significant correlation between parent RF 
and child performance on a composite value of the individual SCORS scales, 
representing both child mentalization capacities and overall child object relations 
functioning.  
2. Secondary quantitative analyses will be directed toward answering the question of 
whether parental RF is more strongly related either to mentalization processes 
directed toward the self or those directed toward understanding the other.  
3. On the basis of prior research, it is anticipated that some of the 8 variables 
considered on the SCORS may be more likely than others to be significantly 
correlated with parental RF. In particular, the ‘Affective Quality of 
Representations’ scale has been shown to be related to attachment status 
(Handelzalts, Fisher & Naot, 2014), which is strongly correlated with 
mentalization. As a result, it is predicted that parental RF will be correlated with 
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child affective quality on the SCORS. This is further bolstered by the finding that 
‘Affective Quality of Representations’ was the variable that was found to be 
disrupted both in children who had suffered physical abuse and those who 
suffered sexual abuse, suggesting that this variable may be a particularly adept 
measure of child emotional functioning.  
4. As detailed in the literature review, parental RF is strongly linked to children’s 
development of a sense of self. Therefore, the ‘Identity and Coherence of Self’ 
scale is also predicted to correlate with parental RF.  
5. Parental RF is also hypothesized to correlate with the SCORS scale 
‘Understanding of Social Causality,’ given the established connection between 
parent mentalization and child emotion understanding/theory of mind, which 
bears much conceptual overlap with the ‘Understanding of Social Causality’ 
scale.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Demographics 
The present research analyzed archival data from 15 parent-child dyads. Thirteen 
of the 15 parent interviews were completed with the child’s mother, one interview was 
completed with a custodial father, and one with a custodial grandmother. The children 
ranged in age from 4.5 to 15. The sample is representative of the larger Psychological 
Center population, which is comprised of mostly working class or lower income families 
of minority ethnic status.   
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Individual Outcome Measures 
(1) Reflective Function Scores on the Parent Development Interview 
 One expert coder with prior established reliability coded reflective functioning on 
the PDI. This is the standard for measurement of RF in PDI and AAI interviews. The 
coder was blind to the research hypotheses and to participant identifying information. 
The RF scale can produce ratings ranging from -1 to 9. In the current sample, the 
data range was limited to only half of the possible scale points, lacking extreme scores on 
both sides of the scale spectrum and mostly distributed at or below the Average RF 
marker. RF scores of parents ranged from 2-6, with the most common scores being 2, 4, 
and 5. An overall score of 2 lies between the diagnostic markers of 1 (Lacking in RF) and 
3 (Questionable or Low RF). An overall score of 5 connotes “Ordinary RF” and indicates 
that the interviewee has a model of their own mind and their child’s mind that is 
integrated and coherent. In the current sample, only one interview was scored a 6. All 
others earned scores demonstrating average or below average RF.  
(2) Social Cognition and Object Relations Scale on the Thematic Apperception Test 
 Seven of the eight SCORS scales were utilized in this study. The eighth scale, 
‘Emotional Investment in Values and Moral Standards’ was excluded because the coders 
were not trained in scoring that subscale. Furthermore, both empirical and theoretical 
support for a potential relationship between parent RF and child performance on this 
scale was lacking. The seven remaining scales were scored on a scale ranging from 1 to 7 
by two expert coders, each of whom independently coded 15 TAT protocols, consisting 
of a total of 164 individual stories. Coders were blind to the research hypotheses, to 
	   45	  
participant information other than an ID number, and to each other’s scores. Interrater 
reliability was calculated for each dimension of the SCORS, and was consistently in the 
good to excellent range (Peters, Hilsenroth, Eudell-Simmons, Blagys & Handler, 2006).  
Reliabilities were similar to or better than those reported in the SCORS literature. All 
reliability coefficients are reported in Table 1.   
 
Table 1. Interrater Reliabilities for Raters of TAT with SCORS, using intraclass 
correlations, average measures, with 95% confidence interval reported 
Variable     Correlation  Lower bound Upper bound 
Complexity of representation of people .735  .640  .806 
Affective quality of representations  .795  .758  .827 
Emotional investment in relationships .816  .750  .865 
Understanding of social causality  .832  .771  .876 
Experience, management of aggression .872  .826  .906 
Self-esteem     .639  .509  .735 
Identity and Coherence of Self  .660  .537  .750 
 
 
 Given the wide range of child ages in the present sample, and the fact that the 
SCORS has been ascertained to differentiate between children of different ages (Niec & 
Russ, 2002; Westen et al., 1991) statistical analyses were run to determine the effect of 
child age on the relationship between parent mentalization and child mentalization. As 
might be expected, child age correlated significantly with a composite value across all 
SCORS scales. Child age also correlated significantly with three of the seven individual 
SCORS scales utilized in this study. All correlations are presented in Tables 2 and 3 
below.  
 
Table 2. Correlation between Child Age and Composite SCORS value 
Child Age    Correlation (Spearman’s Rho) 
Composite     .785**  
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Table 3. Correlations between Individual SCORS Scales and Child Age 
SCORS Scale     Correlation (Spearman’s Rho) 
Complexity of representation of people .77**   
Affective quality of representations  .2   
Emotional investment in relationships .65*   
Understanding of social causality  .8**   
Experience, management of aggression        -.05  
Self-esteem               -.36   
Identity and Coherence of Self            -.012 
 
** Significant at the p < .001 level 
* Significant at the p < .05 level 
 
Relationship between Outcome Measures: 
 Spearman correlations were used in order to measure the quantitative 
relationships between parental Reflective Functioning and child performance on the 
SCORS. The data did not neatly fit the assumptions of normal distribution that ensure the 
validity of the Pearson correlation. The non-parametric Spearman correlations are 
therefore considered to be a more accurate representation of the relationships between the 
outcome variables (Myers & Sirois, 2006).  
None of the Spearman correlations were statistically significant. However, the 
magnitude (effect size) of some of the correlations yielded values that are considered to 
indicate relationships of small and moderate clinical significance (Cohen, 1992). As such, 
what follows is a presentation of the specific results in terms of the magnitude of the 
correlations between variables.   
Hypothesis 1: Parent RF scores will correlate with composite child SCORS values  
 The primary hypothesis was that there would be a positive correlation between 
parental Reflective Functioning scores and child values of the SCORS scales.   
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Past research using the SCORS has shown that the scales of the SCORS are correlated 
with one another (e.g. Niec & Russ, 2002, Ackerman, Hilsenroth, Clemence, Weatherill 
& Fowler, 2001). As a result, prior researchers have chosen to average the SCORS scales 
in order to create an overall SCORS composite score that can serve as a unified indicator 
of an individual’s functioning in the object relations domain (Defife et al., 2015; Stein, 
Hilsenroth, Pinsker-Aspen and Primavera, 2009; Peters et al., 2006; Calabrese, Farber 
and Westen, 2005; Eudell-Simmons, Stein, Defife and Hilsenroth, 2005; Ford, Fisher and 
Larson, 1997). Following the example of these prior studies, a reliability analysis was 
conducted with the seven scales of the SCORS to determine whether they were positively 
correlated with one another. The reliability analysis demonstrated that six of the scales 
were positively correlated with one another (excluding only self-esteem). Cronbach’s 
alpha for these six scales was .66, which approaches the lower limit of what is considered 
to be acceptable reliability (Santos, 1999). As such, a composite of the six scales was 
calculated as an overall SCORS score for each child. (The seventh scale (self-esteem) 
was excluded from the composite because it was not correlated with the other scales and 
so cannot be considered to be measuring the same construct, invalidating its inclusion in 
the composite.) A correlation was run between parental RF and the overall composite 
SCORS value. The Spearman correlation value was .28 (see table 3.) This is a correlation 
of medium effect size and provides an alternative way of understanding the study 
outcomes, as will be further explained in the Discussion section. 
 
Table 4. Correlation between Composite SCORS value and Parental RF on the PDI 
SCORS Scale     Correlation (Spearman’s Rho) 
Composite     .281   
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Hypothesis 2: Parent RF scores will correlate more strongly with those dimensions of 
mentalization that are directed toward the self rather than the other. 
  
 This hypothesis was not confirmed by the data. Of the six SCORS scales utilized 
in the present study, only “Self- Esteem” and “Identity and Coherence of Self” can be 
considered variables that strictly deal with the child’s relationship with the self. “Self-
Esteem” correlated relatively strongly with parental RF, although not in the predicted 
positive direction. “Identity and Coherence of Self” correlated with parental RF with a 
magnitude of .2, which was not significantly different from the magnitude of correlations 
involving scales looking at factors related to others, or scales that encompass elements of 
both self and other-directed processes. The implications of this null finding will be 
further explored in the Discussion section that follows. 
 The next three hypotheses refer to correlations between parent RF and individual 
SCORS scales. Prior to addressing each individual hypothesis, it must be restated that 
none of the correlations between parent RF and individual scores scales were found to be 
statistically significant. However, most of the effect sizes were in the range in which they 
are considered to demonstrate either a small or moderate clinical relationship as per 
statistical convention (Cohen, 1992). All values are presented in table 5 below:  
 
Table 5. Correlations between Individual SCORS scales and Parental RF on the PDI 
SCORS Scale     Correlation (Spearman’s Rho) 
Complexity of representation of people .160   
Affective quality of representations  .149   
Emotional investment in relationships .348   
Understanding of social causality  .217   
Experience, management of aggression .070  
Self-esteem     -.298   
Identity and Coherence of Self  .197 
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Hypothesis 3: Parent RF will be positively correlated with child ‘Affective Quality of 
Representations’ on the SCORS. 
The correlation between parent RF and the ‘Affective Quality of Representations’ 
scale can be considered to be small but not clinically insignificant, with a value of .15. 
Hypothesis 4: Parent RF will be positively correlated with child ‘Identity and Coherence 
of Self’ on the SCORS. 
A correlation with an effect size considered to be of small to moderate magnitude 
(.2) was found between parent RF and the ‘Identity and Coherence of Self’ scale.  
Hypothesis 5: Parent RF will be positively correlated with child ‘Understanding of Social 
Causality.’ 
Parent RF and the child ‘Understanding of Social Causality’ scale were related 
with a value of .22, considered to be a small/medium effect size.  
 
DISCUSSSION 
 
In this section, the results presented above will be reviewed in the context of 
relevant literature. Hypothesis 1 posited that a correlation would be found between parent 
RF on the PDI and the child composite SCORS value. The findings pertaining to this 
hypothesis will be discussed in relation to mentalization research, particularly 
considering what the present study brings to bear on the question of the intergenerational 
transmission of mentalization. Hypothesis 2 suggested that SCORS scales pertaining to 
the self would correlate more strongly with parent RF than SCORS scales having more to 
do with the other. The null results of this hypothesis will be analyzed. Hypotheses 3-5, 
concerning the relationships between parent mentalization and individual SCORS scales, 
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will be discussed. The results will then be explored in terms of how parent RF has been 
shown to relate to child object relations functioning. The theory behind each SCORS 
scale will be explained for a more comprehensive understanding of this aspect of the 
results. Finally, the study limitations and future directions will be presented.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Parental Reflective Function will correlate with child scores on the 
Social Cognition and Object Relations Scale 
As stated above, the correlation between parent RF and the child SCORS 
composite value was not statistically significant. This can be explained by two main 
factors: the small sample size, and the limited range of parental RF scores. Firstly, the 
small sample size inherently limits the chances of detecting statistically significant 
differences. Secondly, the limited variance found in parental RF scores constrained the 
extent to which parental RF could be found to co-vary with other factors. Although the 
RF scale theoretically spans 11 values from -1 to 9, in the present sample scores ranged 
only from 2 to 6, with the vast majority of scores ranging only from 2 to 5.  
Despite the lack of statistical significance, the moderate magnitude of the 
correlation warrants further discussion of its potential meaning in the context of 
mentalization research. 
Evidence for Transmission of Mentalization  
One of the main objectives of the present study was to look at whether 
mentalization, or capacities related to mentalization, would be shown to have been  
transmitted from parent to child. As stated in the results section above, parent 
mentalization on the PDI demonstrated a correlation with the composite SCORS score 
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that was above the standard for a medium effect size. The composite score consisted of 
the following scales: ‘Complexity of Representations’,’ Affective Quality of 
Representations’, ‘Emotional Investment in Relationships’, ‘Understanding of Social 
Causality’, ‘Management of Aggression’, and ‘Identity and Coherence of Self’.  
There is much theoretical support for the notion that these SCORS scales could 
together capture information about the individual child that is akin to the child’s capacity 
to mentalize. Westen et al. (1991) posited that the SCORS scales are able to assess the 
subject’s internalized representations of the self and others, and therefore to tap into the 
attachment information that is known to directly influence mentalization capacity. 
Furthermore, Westen et al., (1991) stated that participants’ SCORS values reflect their 
conscious and unconscious responses to social information in the context of both 
situational cues and their developmental background, and likened this mechanism to the 
internal working models of attachment theory. This description bears remarkable 
similarity to the definition of Reflective Function as an ability to implicitly and explicitly 
make sense of one’s own and other’s behavior as an expression of mental states (Fonagy 
et al., 2002). Furthermore, Westen’s analogous reference to attachment theory, the theory 
from which the concept of reflective function was derived, draws a clear theoretical 
parallel between values on the SCORS and reflective function abilities.  
Indeed, much of the conceptual overlap between the measures of Reflective 
Function and the SCORS is based in the commonalities of the theories to which they 
correspond. Stein et al., (2011) point out three key similarities between attachment theory 
and object relations theory. Firstly, both theories suggest that early relationships with 
caregivers form the foundation to later experiences of the self and of others. Secondly, 
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both theories hypothesize that internalized mental representations are the mechanism 
through which early relationships influence later experience. Thirdly, both theories 
emphasize the roles of separations and reunions in forming and activating internalized 
mental representations. As these commonalities suggest, the theoretical mechanism 
through which early relationships affect later social interactions is shared by both 
Attachment theory and Object Relations theory. Both theories posit that children 
internalize the patterns of their interactions with caregivers and begin to direct their own 
behavior on the basis of the responses they have grown to expect from their caregivers. 
These internalized expectations of interactions are believed to impact the child’s 
interpersonal behavior throughout the life span (Niec & Russ, 2002.)  
There are also empirically-based parallels that can be drawn between the 
Reflective Function scale and the SCORS. Firstly, Reflective Function is known to share 
considerable overlap with the construct of empathy (Katznelson, 2014). Likewise, Niec & 
Russ (2002) found that the SCORS scales of Complexity of Representations, Affective 
Quality of Representations, Emotional Investment in Relationships and Moral Standards, 
and Social Causality were all positively correlated with self and teacher-rater empathy in 
a sample of 2nd-4th grade children. Secondly, Slade (2005, p.271) states that 
“mentalization integrates ways of knowing that are at once cognitive and affective.” 
Similarly, the SCORS composite score is made up of both cognitive and affective 
components. Past research has demonstrated that the ‘Complexity of Representations’ 
and ‘Social Causality’ scales consistently correlate with cognitive measures while 
‘Affective Quality of Representations’ and ‘Emotional Investment in Relationships’ are 
understood to be more affective in nature (Inslegers et al., 2012.) 
	   53	  
In summary, it is reasonable to conclude that the SCORS composite measure may 
serve as a proxy for mentalization abilities in the child. Considering this, the correlation 
of moderate effect-size that was found between parental Reflective Function and the 
SCORS composite can be cautiously interpreted as pointing toward a transmission of 
mentalization, thereby supporting Fonagy’s (2006) assertion that parental mentalizing of 
the child stimulates mentalizing in the child. Of course, without statistically significant 
results, it is impossible to say that this has been conclusively demonstrated by the present 
research, and the significant correlation between the SCORS composite and child age 
further complicates interpretation of the results. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the 
moderate effect size of the correlation is in line with that found by Ensink et al., (2015) in 
their study linking parent RF with child RF in middle childhood.  
The proposed connection between parent and child mentalization is supported by 
a closer look at the data. The parent and child quoted below, referred to as Dyad A for 
ease of reference, both earned scores indicative of lower levels of mentalization. The 
parent’s PDI earned an overall score of ‘2’, which lies between the benchmarks of 
“Absent RF” and “Questionable/Low RF.” Excerpts from the parent interview and child 
TAT are quoted below:    
Parent Interview:  
I: Describe a time in the last week and you and your child really were not 
clicking. 
 
P: ‘When she don’t listen. It’s like when- we don’t click when I tell her, “No, I’m 
not letting you do that.’  Okay, it was her friend’s birthday and she begged me and 
begged me and begged me that she could go…  …she wants to sleep over at 
(friend’s) house. Her mother say yes and I say no. And (child) was very angry. 
She was very mad. She was ‘Ohhh! I don’t like you! I don’t like you!’ 
 
I: Why do you think she was angry?  
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P: She’s spoiled! Because I said no! 
 
I: How did it make you feel?  
 
P: It hurts me. Because you know why? I been there… by myself… without help 
from her father for a long time… and I tell her that. I tell her how I feel. I said, 
‘Wow, (child), you are hurting my feelings.’ She goes, ‘So! I don’t care!’  
 
Child TAT:  
(responding to a card with a picture of a boy in the foreground and a surgical 
scene in the background ) 
 
 “Maybe he is having a flashback. Something happened in the past and he is 
thinking what happened in the past. Next he is going to forget about it. I can’t tell 
what happened before.”  
 
 In her interview, the parent at first leaves her own emotional experience out of the 
example, providing a moment of not clicking based entirely on her daughter’s behavior- 
“when she don’t listen.” When asked explicitly how she feels, the parent’s depiction of 
her own mental state lacks specificity and depth. She says she feels hurt but does not 
elaborate, instead quickly returning to providing a description of the exchange she had 
with her daughter rather than the feelings or thoughts informing the behavior. The parent 
also has difficulty reflecting upon her daughter’s internal states. She identifies that her 
daughter was mad and angry, but explains the feelings as caused by static traits - because 
her daughter is spoiled and did not get her way.  
 Interestingly, the child in the dyad omits a discussion of emotion from her TAT 
story. (This was consistent throughout this child’s TAT responses.) Furthermore, the 
thoughts that she attributes to her characters are extremely concrete, related as directly as 
possible to the action described, much like the mother’s narrative.  
 In contrast, the dyad below, referred to as Dyad B, is an example on the other side 
of the reflective functioning spectrum. The parent here scored a 6 on the PDI, the highest 
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score assigned in the current research sample. This score represents RF that is slightly 
above average, on its way to being what is referred to as “Marked RF” in which the 
parent’s narrative demonstrates a fairly consistent reflective stance indicative of a steady 
psychological model of one’s own and others’ minds. The same excerpt of the PDI and 
same TAT story are quoted for ease of comparison:  
Parent Interview 
I: Can you describe a time in the last week when you and (child) were not 
clicking, or did not click?  
 
P: …A particular morning, he just, I pulled the covers off of him, he pulls it right 
back over him, he just doesn’t feel like wanting to get up, he just, um, questions 
every motive and every move I’m making- why do I have to wear those jeans? I 
want to wear the other jeans. Why do I have to put on that shirt? I don’t want to 
wear that, and I don’t want to brush my hair… 
 
I: And how did you feel?  
P: Frustrated, um, I felt my authority was being questioned, and… just um, 
disrespected.  
 
T: And how do you think he felt?  
P: He felt, um, he felt like I was just opposing on his sleep time opposing on what 
he wanted to wear, he wanted to wear something else. Um, he felt… frustrated as 
well, annoyed, and tired.  
 
Child TAT 
(Responding to card with a picture of a boy in the foreground and a surgical scene 
in the background).  
 
Before I think the grandfather, I believe, was doing… was doing fine but maybe 
had something with him that was wrong. That he needed surgery. So the kid is 
like….um, now the grandpa is getting surgery, like three doctors, while the kid is 
waiting for it to see how he is. In the present I think the grandfather’s gonna be 
okay. And the kid’s gonna be like, really happy. And I think the kid is feeling like 
um, like worried about how his grandfather might be. And I don’t think the 
grandfather’s like, feeling anything right now because usually when you get 
surgery, you fall asleep. (What are they thinking?) He’s thinking about….he’s 
thinking about the future, like how, how happy he’s gonna be about seeing his 
grandpa okay. 
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 Both the parent and child in Dyad B seem to have much to say about the 
emotional lives of themselves and others. The parent here is able to name her own 
frustrations about her son in a non-defensive manner that implicitly demonstrates that she 
takes ownership over her feelings. She is also able to imagine the feelings of her son. 
While she names frustration as an emotion that is present for both herself and her son, her 
nuanced thinking about each of their internal states allows her to differentiate the causes 
of the feeling such that her own feeling is distinguishable from that which she assigns to 
her son. Moreover, both feeling descriptions seem plausible and situationally appropriate. 
 The child in Dyad B includes a lot of information about what his TAT characters 
are thinking and feeling, in stark contrast to the child in Dyad A. This child grapples with 
the difficulty of a picture with two distinct parts but does not back away from wanting to 
detail not only the thoughts and feelings of the boy in the foreground but also those of the 
man on the surgical table. The people in this boy’s narrative come to life as he supplies 
information about the contents of their minds.  
The consistency in mental state focus (or lack thereof) between parent and child 
within these two dyads, as well as the contrast between Dyad A and Dyad B, provide 
both support and an illustration of the finding that parent and child mentalization abilities 
are related to one another. Additionally, this excerpted raw data also invites consideration 
of the potential mechanisms for the quantitative findings. In Dyad A, the narrative 
suggests that the mother struggles to create room for thoughts and feelings alongside 
behaviors. Instead, actions subsume the internal states that precipitated them. It seems  
that in her relationship with her daughter, this mother has attached her own meanings to 
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her daughter’s behavior, unable to reflect on her daughter’s likely thoughts, feelings, 
desires, and other internal states. In turn, this has potentially impaired her daughter’s 
ability to know her own mind and to reflect upon others’ thoughts and feelings, as 
demonstrated by the daughter’s omission of internal states while telling stories on the 
TAT. 
A different parallel process seems to have occurred in Dyad B. Here, the mother 
knows her own mind and can think clearly about her son’s mind. This mother has a 
nuanced understanding of feelings in which she knows them to be qualitatively affected 
by their root causes. One can only imagine that this mother’s responses to her child’s 
behavior are informed by her consideration of the content of his mind. It is no wonder, 
then, that her son, when faced with the task of telling a story about different characters, 
demonstrates an ability to think about the thoughts and feelings of the characters in the 
story. Just as his mother can differentiate her mind from his, he is careful to consider the 
thoughts and feelings of the different characters separately.  
In summary, these excerpts of the data demonstrate the plausibility of the 
transmission of mentalization. They suggest that a parent’s interactions with her/his child 
are very much informed by that parent’s experience of the child’s mind. The two parents 
quoted here not only demonstrate different tendencies toward/away from considering 
their child’s internal states, they differ in terms of whether they see their child’s 
motivations as benign vs. malevolent and to what extent they can separate their child’s 
internal states from that child’s actions and from their own thoughts and feelings as 
parents. In turn, the children respond in unique ways to the task of telling a story about 
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characters in a picture, revealing disparate notions of what information is important to 
convey about people.*  
 
Hypothesis 2: Parental Reflective Function will be more related to scales pertaining 
to the self, rather than to the other:  
 As reviewed above, theory and research have shown that mentalization plays a 
role in the development of a sense of self, and that parent mentalization is associated with 
higher self esteem (Katz et al., 2012). Furthermore, Ensink et al., (2015) found that 
maternal reflective function was an important predictor of Child self Reflective Function 
even when child reflective function was disrupted by something like abuse. Due to this 
prior research and theory, it was expected that scales on the scores that pertain more to 
the self might demonstrate stronger correlations with parental reflective function than 
scales pertaining to the other. On the basis of Westen’s (1995) scale descriptions, it was 
ascertained that the scales that refer to processes directed at the self are ‘Self Esteem’ 
(SE) and ‘Identity and Coherence of Self’ (ICS). The scales that are more other-directed 
are ‘Affective Quality of Relationships,’ ‘Emotional Investment in Relationships’ and 
‘Social Causality,’ while ‘Complexity of Representations’ and ‘Experience and 
Management of Aggression’ deal equally with representations of the self and the other. 
On the basis of this delineation, scores on SE and ICS would be predicted to correlate 
more strongly with parental RF. This was not found in the present study. ICS correlated 
with Parental Reflective Function at a value that was consistent with those of other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* It must be noted that the dyads quoted for this example were selected because both 
parent and child RF were demonstrated to be toward the extremes of high or low for the 
sample. These are two particular dyads chosen to illustrate what transmission of 
mentalization can qualitatively look like; they are not indicative of the overall sample.    
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SCORS scales, and SE demonstrated a surprising moderately-sized negative correlation 
with Parental Reflective Function. Prior to exploring this surprising negative correlation, 
it is important to note that prior research that has detected a distinction between self-
directed mentalization and other-directed mentalization utilized explicit self-report 
measures of child mentalization. The SCORS, in contrast, is applied to the TAT, in which 
the narratives that are generated are at once representations of the self and of others 
projected onto story characters. Therefore, it may be that it is not possible to tease apart 
self and other- related constructs using this measure. 
Nevertheless, the unexpected result of a negative correlation between parent RF 
and self-esteem requires further exploration. The self-esteem scale on the SCORS 
assesses the individual’s self-concept (Stein et al., 2011). At the lowest scale values, the 
individual sees him/herself as evil, and as having negative effects on others. At slightly 
higher scale values the individual sees the self as inferior and inadequate, and 
demonstrates low self-esteem. As scores on the scale increase, representations begin to 
show a range of both positive and negative feelings about the self. At the high end of the 
scale the individual demonstrates reality-based positive feelings about the self 
(Hilsenroth, Stein and Pinsker, 2007).  
 There are various possible explanations for the unexpected result that self-esteem 
correlated negatively with parent RF. It may be that the lack of statistical significance and 
small sample size indicate that the negative correlation between parent reflective 
functioning and child self-esteem reported here is not indicative of a real relationship 
between these two variables. Alternatively, a measurement issue may have been at play. 
Westen (2002), as cited in Kelly (2007), stated that three of the scales of the SCORS-G- 
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(the version of the SCORS utilized here) are hard to score when TATs are the source of 
data. These three scales are ICS, SE and AGG (Experience and Management of 
Aggression). In the current data set, two of these three scales showed relationships with 
parent reflective function that were distinct from those of the other SCORS scales, with 
SE correlating negatively with parent RF and AGG being the only variable that correlated 
with parent RF with a negligible effect size. Future research may be able to clarify the 
veracity or erroneous nature of the negative correlation between parent mentalization and 
self-esteem found here.  
Were future research to demonstrate that the finding between parent RF and child 
self-esteem on the SCORS was not a statistical accident, a non-statistical explanation for 
this finding would be warranted. One such explanation revolves around the fact that for 
this study the child population utilized was a clinical population. The exact diagnoses of 
the children in the study are not known. However, it can be hypothesized on the basis of 
the general child population at the Psychological Center and the fact that the main referral 
sources are neighborhood schools that the children in the sample likely suffered some 
internalizing difficulties such as depression, and some externalizing difficulties such as 
acting out or attention problems in school. With greater mentalization capacities comes 
greater self-awareness, greater knowledge of what one is thinking and feeling, and greater 
insight into what others’ think and feel, including about oneself. It may be, then, that in 
this clinical population, in which the children can assumed to have a good deal of 
negative affect and problematic relationships, greater insight into their own affect and 
others’ perceptions of the self could in fact lead to lower self-esteem. Indeed, this might 
be especially true given that the data was collected just as these children were presenting 
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for intake at the Psychological Center, with their psychological difficulties thus being 
front and center in their minds.  
 
Hypotheses 3: There will be a positive correlation between parent RF and child 
SCORS values on the ‘Affective Quality of Representations’ scale.  
The ‘Affective Quality of Representations’ scale assesses the general emotional 
tone of a child’s representations of people and relationships. Rather than moving along a 
developmental trajectory as do many of the other scales, progression on this scale is 
marked by the move from predominantly negative to predominantly positive object 
representations. (Indeed, this scale did not correlate significantly with child age). At the 
lowest point on the ‘Affective Quality of Representations’ scale, people are represented 
as violent or abandoning, and at the highest scale point interactions with others can be 
seen as not only benign but also valuable.   
 As was true of all correlations between outcome variables, the relationship 
between parent RF and child values on the ‘Affective Quality of Representations’ scale 
was not statistically significant. The effect size of the correlation (.15), was of a 
magnitude considered to be indicative of a small clinical relationship. This points toward 
the relationship between the variables that was expected, but must be replicated with 
statistically significant results in order for this relationship to be truly empirically 
established. 
  
Hypothesis 4: There will be a positive correlation between parent RF and child 
SCORS values on the ‘Identity and Coherence of Self’ scale.  
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 The correlation between parent RF and child values on the ‘Identity and 
Coherence of Self’ scale had an effect size of .197, indicating a small/moderate clinical 
relationship. Again, in order for this relationship to be definitively demonstrated, 
replication with statistical significance would be necessary. Nevertheless, this meaningful 
effect size suggests that as expected, there is some relationship between parent 
mentalization capacities and a measure of selfhood.   
The ‘Identity and Coherence of Self’ scale measures the extent to which the sense 
of self is firmly established and integrated. Low scores on this scale depict a fragmented 
sense of self. Scores in the middle point to an unstable sense of self in which multiple 
aspects of selfhood can shift easily (including goals or emotions about the self). At the 
higher levels of this scale the individual’s representations suggest the achievement of a 
consistent and integrated sense of self complete with long-term aspirations and a sense of 
purpose (Hilsenroth et al., 2007). As summarized in the literature review, Fonagy’s 
theory of mentalization posits that parent reflective function is crucial in the development 
of a secure and integrated sense of self. The current findings lend tentative empirical 
support to that view. 
 
Hypothesis 5: There will be a positive correlation between parent RF and child 
SCORS values on the ‘Understanding of Social Causality’ scale.  
 The “Understanding of Social Causality’ scale on the SCORS measures the 
accuracy, rationality, complexity and psychological-mindedness of the attributions that 
individuals make about the causes of other people’s behavior, thoughts and feelings 
(Westen, 1991). Low scores are earned when individuals give explanations of 
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psychological or interpersonal events that are either not based on the idea of causality at 
all, or that are illogical. At the scale’s midpoint, representations demonstrate accurate 
depictions of causality and rudimentary understanding of the ways in which thoughts and 
feelings affect behavior. At the highest scale point, not only is there a complex 
understanding of how thoughts, feelings and behaviors interrelate as causal factors in 
interpersonal interactions, there is also an understanding of unconscious motivations. On 
the level of face validity, this scale shares the most conceptual overlap with theory of 
mind, although there is no known empirically demonstration of a quantitative relationship 
between the two. 
 The correlation between parent RF and child scores on the ‘Understanding of 
Social Causality’ scale had an effect size of .2, another small-moderate clinical 
relationship. This finding echoes the studies that have demonstrated links between parent 
mentalization and child Theory of Mind development (Meins et al., 2013; Meins et al., 
2002). However, unlike the prior two scales discussed, the ‘Social Causality’ scale had a 
strong significant correlation with child age (Rho= .8, p < .001). This significant 
correlation with age (in a sample with children of a wide range of ages) complicates the 
ability to say that it is parent mentalization, rather than merely child age, which affected 
child scores on the scale.  
  
Evidence for Effects of Parent Mentalization on Child Internal Representations of 
Object Relations 
 Although initial hypothesis predicted that the three scales discussed in Hypotheses 
3-5 would correlate most strongly with parent RF, the actual data showed similar effect 
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sizes for each of the individual SCORS scales, as well as the SCORS composite. 
Therefore, it is worth considering what the findings of small and moderate effect sizes 
can say about the relationship between parent mentalization and child object relations in 
the context of object relations research.  
Firstly, it should be noted that the design of the current study is unique in the 
context of the existing SCORS literature. Past SCORS research has primarily been used 
to distinguish between clinical and nonclinical groups of children. The current study aims 
to go one step farther and consider how a child’s object relations are affected by a 
characteristic of their parents rather than a characteristic of the children themselves. 
Given the insignificant findings, it is not possible to say that it has been demonstrated that 
parent mentalization has been shown to be linked to child object relations. Nevertheless, 
it is noteworthy that the effect sizes in the present research point toward a meaningful 
result given that the variable of parental mentalization is far more subtle and less concrete 
than other factors studied with the SCORS to date, such as the presence of a diagnosis or 
the experience of abuse. This suggests that parental mentalization should be taken 
seriously as a factor that affects child and adolescent object relations.  
 Previous SCORS research also provides an alternative explanation for the results. 
As cited above, several studies have worked to establish the SCORS as a developmental 
measure. While some studies have shown no correlation between SCORS ratings and 
child age (Inslegers et al., 2012) others have found the scales to be able to discriminate 
among developmental levels in participants (Niec & Russ, 2002; Westen et al., 1990). In 
the current sample, the SCORS composite score and three of the individual SCORS 
scales correlated significantly with child age. This suggests that at least in the case of the 
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SCORS composite and these three scales, the relationship between parent RF and child 
Object Relations functioning was heavily influenced by child age. A closer look at the 
individual SCORS scales not discussed above will further shed light on what the results 
suggest about how parent mentalization might affect child object relations functioning.  
Emotional Investment in Relationships 
 This scale considers the nature of the participant’s representations of 
relationships, and in particular, what can be gained from relationships with others. At the 
lower levels of the scale, considered to be consistent with earlier stages of development, 
the individual demonstrates concern only for himself, seeing relationships merely as a 
means of gratifying of his own needs. Increasing scores on this scale indicate increased 
investment in relationships, and increased mutuality, commitment, empathy and concern. 
At the highest scale point, individuals have representations that demonstrate an ability to 
maintain a strong sense of their autonomous self in the context of mutual relationships 
(Westen, 1991). The positive correlation of moderate effect size between parental RF and 
the ‘Emotional Investment in Relationships’ scale may suggest that children whose 
parents mentalize more are more able to differentiate self from other, and to consider 
relationships as mutually rewarding. However, the ‘Emotional Investment in 
Relationships’ scale was one of the scales that correlated significantly with child age. If 
future research were able to replicate this relationship while controlling for child age, this 
finding would be considered consistent with prior research finding that children whose 
parents engage in more emotion-coaching have better peer-relationships (Katz et al., 
2012).  
Complexity of Representations of People 
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 This scale captures the extent to which representations of the other are 
differentiated from the self, complex, and able to integrate both positive and negative 
traits (Westen, 1991). Low values on this scale demonstrate representations of others that 
are undifferentiated from the self and focused on actions rather than personality. 
Furthermore, low scores on this scale are consistent with the assumption that traits are 
global and either all good or all bad. At the midpoint of this scale the individual is able to 
represent others as having a small amount of personality or internal mental life. High 
values on this scale connote representations of others in which subjective experience is 
grasped in a complex way and history and other factors are understood to inform 
personality. In many ways, this scale is able to measure some of the factors that were 
noted as distinct in the examples of Dyad A and Dyad B above. As discussed earlier, the 
mother in Dyad B demonstrated an ability to differentiate herself from her son in a way 
that was not as evident in the mother in Dyad A. Furthermore, it was noted that the 
characters in the story told by the child in Dyad B demonstrated a greater presence of 
internal life than the story told by the child in Dyad A. This scale also correlated 
significantly with child age.  
Experience and Management of Aggression 
 The only scale that did not seem to relate to parental mentalization in any 
meaningful way was that of Experience and Management of Aggression. A bottom score 
on this scale is assigned when the participant’s representations are of people who have 
limitless aggression and no ability to control it, who are sadistic and violent. A slightly 
higher score is assigned when representations display anger, passive aggression, and an 
inability to stave off physical harm to the self. At a higher level anger is avoided through 
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the use of defense mechanisms, and at the highest level anger is appropriately expressed 
and people are able to practice appropriate self-assertion.  
It may be that the fact that the present research drew children from a clinical 
population influenced the null finding of a relationship between parent mentalization and 
child management of aggression. In a clinical sample of predominantly male children in 
middle childhood, the aggression associated with much of the psychopathology of 
children of this age may have overpowered any connection between parent characteristics 
and child functioning in this particular domain of object relations.  
 
Limitations 
 Several factors must be considered as limitations to the conclusions that can be 
drawn on the basis of the present research. There are certain aspects of the sample that 
bear mention. The sample size of the current study is small, which lowered the possibility 
of finding statistically significant results. Statistical significance provides a certain 
confidence in the findings that cannot be provided by effect sizes alone. Combined with 
the small sample size, the large range of child ages included in the study poses a 
particular difficulty in the interpretation of the results due to the significant correlation 
between child age and some of the SCORS scales. Future research should either use a 
sample of more homogenous age, or a larger sample size in which the effects of child age 
can be more easily measured. Finally, as mentioned previously, there was limited 
variability in the Reflective Function scores of the parents in the sample, with all scores 
falling in the middle range of Reflective Function, and a dearth of either particularly low 
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or particularly high RF values. This imposed yet another challenge to achieving 
statistically significant results.  
Other aspects of the sample limit the generalizeability of the present research. 
Firstly, the vast majority of the parent participants in the study were mothers, also 
limiting the generalizeability of the results to fathers and other caregivers. With regard to 
the children included in the research, the current sample was culled from a clinical 
population, with all children in the study either receiving or seeking psychotherapy 
treatment at the time of testing. This may affect the generalizeability of the results to a 
non-clinical sample.   
In addition to limitations pertaining to the sample, there are limitations related to 
the correlational methods utilized in the current study, namely that causality cannot be 
established. We cannot know if it is indeed parental reflective function that affects 
children’s performance on the SCORS scales, or if other factors are at play and 
influencing both variables. For example, maternal education level has been found to 
influence children’s performance on theory of mind tasks (Meins et al., 2002; Meins & 
Fernyhough, 1999). Similarly, parental education has inconsistently been found to 
influence parental reflection scores (Rosenblum et al., 2008; Fonagy et al., 1991c). Future 
research would benefit from measurement of parental education to better understand the 
ways in which this factor might play a role in the transmission of mentalization 
capacities. Likewise, two subscales of the SCORS- the ‘Understanding of Social 
Causality’ and ‘Complexity of Representation of People’ scales- have been found to be 
related to child verbal achievement (Pinsker-Aspen, Stein & Hilsenroth, 2007; Niec & 
Russ, 2002; Levy, Blatt & Shaver, 1998; Leigh, Westen, Barends, Mendel & Byers, 
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1992). Since child verbal achievement was not measured as part of this research, it is not 
impossible that some connection between parent and child intelligence and/or child 
verbal skill is driving some of the connections observed here.  
One final limitation of the present research is the lack of consistency in the 
administration of the PDI interview and the TAT. The interviews and TATs were 
administered by a diverse group of training therapists, some of whom were more 
practiced than others in the administration of these instruments. The quality and nature of 
the inquiry is therefore not uniform across data points, which may have affected the 
results. Although it is not logical that this would have affected the trends observed in any 
systematic way, it is nevertheless a methodical limitation of the present research that 
should be addressed in any future studies.  
 
Future Directions 
 In order to address the limitations presented above, it would be beneficial for 
future research to replicate the present study with a larger sample so as to increase 
statistical power and possibility of generalization of the results. A larger sample size 
would also permit the direct measurement of the potential effect of child age on the 
relationship between parent and child mentalization. Future studies should also measure 
parent educational level and child verbal intelligence, given the mixed prior findings of 
the importance of these factors in influencing both of the outcome measures used in the 
present research. Finally, in the present study the SCORS has been used as a proxy for 
child mentalization. Future research might more explicitly measure child mentalization 
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alongside the SCORS to empirically demonstrate the utility of the SCORS in detecting 
aspects of child mentalization capacities.  
 Another important direction for future research would be a study looking 
simultaneously at both attachment and mentalization transmission, given the well-
established reciprocal relationship between the two constructs, outlined in the literature 
review. While mentalization is considered to be one of the likely mechanisms for the 
intergenerational transmission of attachment, the reciprocal may also be true- that 
attachment may mediate the transmission of mentalization across generations. As stated 
above, Arnott and Meins (2007) found that RF on the AAI predicted secure infant 
attachment for both mothers and fathers above and beyond narrative coherence, the major 
determinant of the autonomous attachment classification. Furthermore, attachment has 
been found to predict earlier Theory of Mind development (Meins, 1997) and 
performance on theory of mind tasks in early childhood (Fonagy et al., 1997). To the 
extent that Theory of Mind bears much conceptual overlap with mentalization, and with 
aspects of the SCORS such as Social Causality, these findings alongside those of the 
present research beg the question of how parental RF and attachment security work 
together to influence child Theory of Mind/mentalization abilities.  
 A new body of theoretical work also raises new questions about the role 
attachment may play in the transmission of mentalization. Fonagy and Campbell (2015) 
posit that one of the major evolutionary advantages of attachment is its provision of a 
context in which mentalization capacities are acquired and social understandings are 
achieved. Along with this notion comes the idea that within the attachment relationship 
epistemic trust is generated through ostensive cues. Ostensive cues are information that is 
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signaled as being an important communication of culturally relevant material (such as the 
infant’s expressions, which are marked and mirrored by the caregiver). Mind-oriented 
behaviors such as those involved in mentalization inherently provide an abundance of 
ostensive cues, leading to a dynamic between adult and child in which each one is 
receptive to new information and learning (Fonagy et al., 2017). Furthermore, where 
epistemic trust exists (within a secure attachment relationship) the recipient of the 
information is more likely to perceive information from the communicator as both 
relevant and generalizeable (Fonagy et al. 2017). Both of these ideas have implications 
for the development of mentalization capacities in the child, and the process of 
transmission of mentalization. If mind-minded behaviors provide an environment of 
receptivity to new information, then children in relationships with mentalizing caregivers 
may be more open to learn about internal states- their own and others’. Similarly, where 
more epistemic trust has been generated, the child marks information received about his 
own and others’ internal states as more relevant and able to be generalized, thus being 
perhaps more likely to continue to mentalize both himself and others. Epistemic trust is 
therefore an important potential mediator/moderator to be considered in future research 
on the transmission of mentalization.  
Last but not least, in order to successfully tackle the question of mentalization 
transmission from an empirical standpoint, research must address the development of 
mentalization in childhood. As stated in the literature review, there is a rather nuanced 
and comprehensive theory about how mentalization develops, but little empirical 
literature to support it. Very recent theoretical developments may highlight a pathway 
forward in the study of mentalization development. In the present, researchers are 
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highlighting the multidimensional nature of mentalization with four main dimensions 
having been identified: (1) cognitive/affective (2) self/other (3) implicit/explicit and (4) 
inner/outer (pertaining to noticeable external cues like facial expressions versus 
unobservable inner cues like motivations or wishes) (Bateman & Fonagy, 2011). The 
acknowledgment of these four dimensions reinforces the merit of empirically studying 
the quality as well as quantity of mentalization. Furthermore, they help to delineate a 
pathway forward in studying how mentalization gone awry can inform development of 
psychopathology. For example, Sharp and Fonagy and colleagues (Bo et al., 2017; 
Fonagy et al., 2015; Sharp, 2104) posit a model of Borderline Personality Disorder in 
which patients with BPD are seen as having the propensity to hypermentalize- meaning 
that they attribute motivations, desires, beliefs, etc. to other people when there is no 
objective evidence to inform these attributions (Sharp et al., 2013 as cited in Bo et al., 
2017). This hypermentalizing tendency is believed to result from an un-ideal interaction 
between the dimensions of mentalization in which cognitive and affective mentalizing are 
unintegrated, there is difficulty in distinguishing whether mental states belong to the self 
or the other, and implicit/explicit mentalization can not be flexibly alternated due to 
contextual demands. This example highlights the utility of considering variation among 
the four dimensions of mentalization in future research. Specifically, as models of 
mentalization development are empirically tested, the ways in which capacities along 
these four dimensions come into being will be profoundly informative for future 
understanding of mentalization transmission and the development of psychopathology.  
  
Conclusion 
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 In conclusion, the present study adds to a small body of research considering the 
ways in which parent and child mentalizing capacities are linked, as theory would 
predict. The current research extends this area of inquiry to a child clinical sample. By 
utilizing measures created from similar but distinct theoretical traditions, this study forges 
new ground in illustrating a connection between mentalization and object relations. 
Taken together, the study results highlight the importance of parent reflective functioning 
in the mentalization capacities and object relations functioning of children with 
psychological distress.  
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